Evaluating E-Rulemaking: Public Participation and Political Institutions by Benjamin, Stuart Minor
01__BENJAMIN.DOC 10/4/2006 1:08 PM 
 
 
Duke Law Journal 
VOLUME 55 MARCH 2006 NUMBER 5 
THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL  
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW ISSUE 
EVALUATING E-RULEMAKING: 
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION  
AND POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 
STUART MINOR BENJAMIN† 
ABSTRACT 
  Proponents of electronic rulemaking proposals designed to 
enhance ordinary citizens’ involvement in the rulemaking process 
have debated with skeptics the question of whether such initiatives will 
actually increase citizens’ involvement. In the debate thus far, 
however, proponents have largely assumed the desirability of such 
involvement, and skeptics have usually not challenged that 
assumption. In addition, proponents and skeptics have focused on the 
relationship between agencies and individuals, failing to consider the 
larger administrative law context—and in particular the role played 
by Congress and the courts. This Article considers e-rulemaking in a 
broader institutional context and directly addresses the desirability of 
the proposed e-rulemaking initiatives. The Article finds that there are 
good reasons to believe that e-rulemaking initiatives’ costs outweigh 
their benefits, but that it would be premature to settle on that 
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conclusion. The Article ultimately advocates modest experimentation 
with e-rulemaking, both to allow for further evaluation of e-
rulemaking and to provide additional data about the rulemaking 
process more generally. 
INTRODUCTION 
In the last ten to fifteen years, vast numbers of people have 
become familiar with basic techniques for online collaboration—e.g., 
e-mail and files stored on central servers available to multiple users. 
And in the last few years people have become increasingly familiar 
with tools that allow for even richer collaboration, such as wikis, 
communities built on reputational capital, and even multi-player 
video games. In light of these developments, academic commentators 
and public officials have discussed new, more interactive modes of 
collective production of intellectual goods. Thus there has been 
extensive discussion of open-source or peer-production models for a 
broad range of products, including software, information directories, 
data-evaluation, and biomedical research. In the administrative law 
context, the proposals have focused more specifically on opening up 
the rulemaking process to richer input from individuals, including 
changes to the administrative process, not only to encourage such 
input but also to make it more meaningful.1 In this Article, I assess the 
 
 1. See Steven J. Balla, Between Commenting and Negotiation: The Contours of Public 
Participation in Agency Rulemaking, 1 I/S 59, 59 (2005) (“Researchers and practitioners are on 
the cusp of a new era in rulemaking, one in which the continued application of information 
technology has the potential to transform both the conduct and management of 
rulemaking . . . .”); Thomas C. Beierle, Digital Deliberation: Engaging the Public Through 
Online Policy Dialogues, in DEMOCRACY ONLINE: THE PROSPECTS FOR POLITICAL RENEWAL 
THROUGH THE INTERNET 155, 155 (Peter M. Shane ed., 2004) (“Accompanying the last 
decade’s enthusiasm for the Internet economy were equally extravagant expectations about 
information technologies’ impact on democracy and governance.”); Barbara H. Brandon & 
Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and Other Tools for Strengthening Our Civil 
Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1478 (2002) (“The Internet, properly utilized, can make 
policymaking more transparent, and enable Americans outside the Beltway to participate more 
effectively in the activities of the federal government.”); Cary Coglianese, E-Rulemaking: 
Information Technology and the Regulatory Process, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 353, 355 (2004) 
[hereinafter Coglianese, E-Rulemaking] (“Electronic rulemaking, or e-rulemaking, offers the 
potential to overcome some of the informational challenges associated with developing 
regulations.”); Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Citizen Participation in Rulemaking, 1 I/S 33, 
34 (2005) [hereinafter Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation] (“[M]any lawyers and 
policymakers look with hope to new information technologies as a way of overcoming 
rulemaking’s democracy deficit.”); Stephen M. Johnson, The Internet Changes Everything: 
Revolutionizing Public Participation and Access to Government Information Through the 
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significance and desirability of these proposed changes to the 
administrative rulemaking process. In so doing, I connect these 
questions with larger ones about the role of Congress and the courts, 
the desirability of public participation in the rulemaking process, and 
the role of experimentation. 
The range of ways that information technologies could change 
the rulemaking process is endless.2 An agency could receive 
automatic feedback—for example, by setting up a system of 
electronic sensors to monitor a pollutant and send information back 
to the agency. Information technology could help flag foreseeable 
problems like conflicts with other rules or statutes, or even conflicts 
within rules, via sophisticated software that would search through all 
available rules and statutes to identify other provisions with wording 
that would seem to cover the subject of a given section of a 
regulation. Within the four corners of the rulemaking process itself, 
information technologies could make it easier for agencies to give 
notice to potentially interested people and allow those people to 
access and search the proposed rule, could allow for more interactive 
 
Internet, 50 ADMIN. L. REV. 277, 279 (1998) (“The Internet and other modern technological 
innovations can expand public access to agency decisions . . . .”); Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: 
The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. 
REV 342, 439 (2004) (“Both federal and state agencies are constructing Web sites with 
rulemaking documents, which allow citizens to submit electronic comments on proposed 
rules.”); Jeffrey S. Lubbers, The Future of Electronic Rulemaking: A Research Agenda, ADMIN. 
& REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2002, at 6 (“The second purpose of the transformation of rulemaking 
is a participatory one—making it possible for participants to participate in real time . . . .”); Beth 
Simone Noveck, The Electronic Revolution in Rulemaking, 53 EMORY L.J. 433, 433 (2004) 
[hereinafter Noveck, Electronic Revolution] (“Informal rulemaking . . . is about to be 
transformed by the silent revolution of e-government . . . .”); Beth Simone Noveck, The Future 
of Citizen Participation in the Electronic State, 1 I/S 1, 3 (2005) [hereinafter Noveck, Citizen 
Participation] (“Now the crafting of regulations will shift from a paper-based to a fully 
electronic lawmaking process.”); Stuart W. Shulman, The Internet Still Might (But Probably 
Won’t) Change Everything, 1 I/S 111, 111 (2005) (“The evolution of information and 
communication technologies has the potential to revolutionize citizen participation in the 
democratic process.”); Steven L. Clift, E-Government and Democracy: Representation and 
Citizen Engagement in the Information Age 2 (Feb. 2004), http://www.publicus.net/ 
articles/cliftegovdemocracy.doc (“Leading governments, with democratic intent, are 
incorporating information and communication technologies into their e-government 
activities.”). 
 2. Probably the most comprehensive lists can be found in Noveck, Citizen Participation, 
supra note 1, and in Cary Coglianese, The Internet and Public Participation in Rulemaking 7 
(Regulatory Pol’y Program, Working Paper RPP-2003-05, 2003), available at 
http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/research/rpp/RPP-2003-05.pdf. See also Robert Carlitz & 
Rosemary Gunn, E-Rulemaking: A New Avenue for Public Engagement, 1 J. PUB. 
DELIBERATION Article 7, at 5 (2005), available at http://services.bepress.com/cgi/viewcontent. 
cgi?article=1008&context=jpd; Clift, supra note 1. 
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and collaborative communications from individuals during the 
rulemaking process, and could make it easier for people and entities 
to monitor the implementation and enhance the enforcement of rules. 
My focus in this Article is on proposals to integrate electronic 
communications into the rulemaking process as a means of increasing 
communications to agencies from any and all interested citizens.3 As I 
noted above, there are many other possible ways that information 
technologies could influence rulemaking, but the changes that seem 
to generate the most excitement are those that would allow any 
citizens who cared about a particular issue to give their input to 
agencies.4 The reason for this excitement, and thus for my choice of 
focus, is that the rulemaking process is perceived as one that is 
dominated by interest groups and is largely opaque to the public at 
large.5 Providing for feedback from electronic sensors to agencies, or 
for easier communications from agencies to individuals, may be a 
good way to improve agencies’ efficiency; but providing for more 
effective communication from interested citizens to agencies could 
transform rulemaking more profoundly, or so its proponents suggest. 
If people can communicate easily with the agency and collaborate 
easily with each other in formulating their communications to the 
agency, and if the agency then modifies its decisions in light of those 
communications, then the rulemaking process itself will be reshaped. 
Anyone interested in a particular rulemaking initiative could get 
involved, with a realistic belief that her input could make a difference; 
and the reasonableness of that belief could lead many others to get 
involved as well, producing an upward spiral of individual 
 
 3. For this reason, I do not focus on suggestions that agencies select a small group of 
citizens and get their feedback in the form of a focus group or virtual jury. See Coglianese, 
Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 12 (noting the possibility of virtual juries and 
regulatory polling); Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra note 1 (same). 
 4. See Brandon & Carlitz, supra note 1, at 1422 (“[T]he federal government should build a 
transparent online environment that encourages public input.”); Coglianese, Internet and 
Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 33 (expressing the popular view that the Internet may 
revolutionize citizen participation in rulemaking); Elena Larsen & Lee Raine, The Rise of the E-
Citizen: How People Use Government Agencies’ Web Sites (Pew Internet & American Life 
Project 2002), available at http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Govt_Website_Rpt.pdf (noting 
rise in the use of the Internet to send comments on policy choices of public officials). 
 5. See, e.g., CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES 
WRITE LAW AND MAKE POLICY 113, 189 (3d ed. 2003); Coglianese, Internet and Citizen 
Participation, supra note 1, at 38–40 (summarizing data on who participates in agency 
rulemaking process); Marissa Martino Golden, Interest Groups in the Rule-Making Process: 
Who Participates? Whose Voices Get Heard?, 8 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & THEORY 245, 265 (1998) 
(noting that interest groups and businesses dominate rulemaking submissions). 
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involvement that would change rulemaking into a truly participatory 
process.6 
That, at any rate, is the hope of the proponents of e-rulemaking 
(the term I will use in this Article as convenient shorthand).7 The 
purpose of this Article is to discuss the likelihood and the desirability 
of that transformation. Other commentators have considered these 
issues (often briefly), but their descriptive efforts have usually 
focused on two institutional players—agencies and individuals—and 
have not focused on the role of Congress and the courts.8 The latter in 
particular are major players; significant rulemakings are frequently 
challenged in federal court, and judicial review thus affects 
rulemaking to a significant degree. In this Article, I attempt to take 
fuller account of all the possible effects of the implementation of e-
rulemaking initiatives on the rulemaking process. I find that there is a 
strong basis to doubt that e-rulemaking will have much of a positive 
impact on rulemaking. I then turn to the question of evaluation with 
the broad range of costs and benefits in mind. The question of 
evaluation raises one of the most basic questions in administrative 
 
 6. Furthermore, according to one school of thought, such a transformation of rulemaking 
would give it much greater democratic legitimacy. Many theorists have emphasized the 
importance of discussions among citizens in a democracy, suggesting that democratic legitimacy 
requires meaningful political exchange among citizens. See, e.g., BENJAMIN R. BARBER, 
STRONG DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE 136 (1984) (“[T]here can be 
no strong democratic legitimacy without ongoing talk.”); EMILE DURKHEIM, PROFESSIONAL 
ETHICS AND CIVIC MORALS 89 (1957) (“The more that deliberation and reflection and a critical 
spirit play a considerable part in the course of public affairs, the more democratic the nation.”); 
ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS 184–87 (1995) (discussing and adopting such a 
theory of democracy). In this spirit, transforming rulemaking into a participatory process would 
increase its democratic legitimacy. 
 7. See ELAINE CIULLA KAMARCK & JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., GOVERNANCE.COM: 
DEMOCRACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2002); Beierle, supra note 1, at 155 (arguing that 
Internet-based rulemaking participation opens the prospect for vastly increased participation); 
Brandon & Carlitz, supra note 1, at 1422 (recognizing that “the Internet could fundamentally 
change how the public participates in federal policymaking,” but noting need for further 
innovations in participative forums); Clift, supra note 1, at 2 (considering potential democracy-
enhancing aspects of Internet rulemaking); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental Protection in the 
Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115, 170 (2004) (“People with good ideas—even those who 
never get to Washington or their state capitals—thereby can have a chance to shape policy 
outcomes.”); Johnson, supra note 1, at 279 (noting the potential for the Internet to expand 
rulemaking participation); Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 1 (noting the potential 
for enhanced participation but arguing that further innovation in the participative forums is 
required). 
 8. See generally Coglianese, E-Rulemaking, supra note 1 (considering the interaction of 
administrative agencies and the public in e-rulemaking); Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra 
note 1 (same); Shulman, supra note 1 (same). 
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law—do we want greater public participation in the rulemaking 
process? In my view, that age-old question takes on a slightly 
different character when significant collaboration among individuals 
is relatively easy, as is arguably the case with some electronic 
communications tools. Even in light of these new tools, however, 
there are still good reasons to be skeptical about the impact and 
desirability of e-rulemaking. The problem is that the experience with 
e-rulemaking has been too modest, and thus the level of 
experimentation has been too small, to reach a firm conclusion that 
the costs of e-rulemaking outweigh the benefits. The combination of 
justified skepticism and the lack of empirical confirmation leads me to 
the ultimate conclusion that the government should self-consciously, 
rigorously, and narrowly experiment with e-rulemaking, treating 
agencies as laboratories of democracy. Such experimentation would 
allow researchers both to evaluate e-rulemaking proposals specifically 
and to gain information about the rulemaking process more generally. 
States may or may not serve as good laboratories, but in this instance 
I think that agencies have the potential to be excellent ones. 
Part I briefly summarizes proposals to enhance public 
participation in the rulemaking process. Part II then turns to the 
question of impact, asking how those proposals might affect the 
various players in the rulemaking process, including individuals, 
agencies, Congress, and the courts. Finally, Part III considers those 
impacts in evaluating the desirability of the e-rulemaking proposals. 
My ultimate conclusion is that the uncertainties about the impact and 
desirability of e-rulemaking are sufficiently great that experimenting 
with e-rulemaking should proceed on a trial basis, in an attempt to 
gain greater empirical grounding before the government plunges into 
any particular set of changes to the rulemaking process. 
I.  WHAT SORTS OF CHANGES AM I TALKING ABOUT? 
The integration of information technologies in general, and the 
Internet in particular, into the rulemaking process could take myriad 
forms. Even among technologies designed to enhance participation 
by any and all interested citizens, there are many possible variations. I 
will briefly summarize the main possibilities. 
Starting with the most straightforward and modest changes, 
integrating the Internet into rulemaking can make it easier for 
ordinary citizens to comment on agency rulemaking proposals. 
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Agencies began taking steps in this direction in the 1990s.9 Agencies 
have allowed people to comment via electronic submissions 
(including via e-mail), making it easier for them to present their views 
to the agency. Moreover, some agencies have digitized their 
processes, so that all comments are available online.10 
More recently, the federal government has moved to centralize 
and unify e-rulemaking procedures through the Federal Docket 
Management System (FDMS) and the Regulations.gov website. That 
website (which has been running since 2003) has links for documents 
open for comment and for lists of regulations by topic and date, as 
well as search tools for regulations.11 More ambitiously, the aim of the 
docket management system is to store, and allow for retrieval of, all 
agency documents related to rulemaking.12 
The centralizing tendency reflected in the federal docket 
management system and Regulations.gov has potential benefits in the 
form of economies of scale and making it easier for citizens to track 
and comment on any pending regulations, but it also reduces the 
chances that agencies will experiment with e-rulemaking initiatives on 
their own. As I discuss in Part III.D, I believe that is a significant cost. 
In any event, these measures put comments online, but they do 
not create possibilities beyond those already available on paper. One 
can easily imagine broader changes, though. Indeed, a number of 
commentators have proposed them.13 Individuals could post a 
 
 9. See generally UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ELECTRONIC 
RULEMAKING: PROGRESS MADE IN DEVELOPING CENTRALIZED E-RULEMAKING SYSTEM 
(2005), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d05777.pdf (chronicling impact of e-
rulemaking efforts). 
 10. The Federal Communications Commission, for example, makes all submissions 
available on its website at http://www.fcc.gov. 
 11. Cary Coglianese et al., Unifying Rulemaking Information: Recommendations for the 
New Federal Docket Management System, 57 ADMIN. L. REV. 621, 628 (2005). 
 12. See id. at 628 (“Essentially, the FDMS will make the public records of rulemaking 
activities, in their entirety, readily available via the Internet to anyone interested in tracking 
government rulemaking.”); see also Cindy Skrzycki, Funds for E-Docket Filed Under ‘No,’ 
WASH. POST, Jan. 10, 2006, at D1 (noting delays in the completion of the docket management 
system). 
 13. See generally Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1 (arguing that 
existing efforts to apply information technology to rulemaking are unlikely to vastly increase 
citizen participation, but acknowledging that newer technologies may facilitate such a result); 
Noveck, Citizen Participation, supra note 1 (suggesting that changes in the software used for e-
rulemaking are necessary to facilitate greater participation); Shulman, supra note 1 (expressing 
skepticism over the ability of the Internet to change rulemaking significantly, at least in light of 
current technologies). 
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response to a given communication, or set of communications, 
producing threaded comments resembling a dialogue that would 
allow other individuals (and ultimately the agency) to see a string of 
communications on a given topic. Either in addition to or instead of 
such procedures, individuals could review electronic communications 
to the agency and electronically join or endorse one or more with 
which they agreed.14 Similarly, individuals could rate comments on a 
scale from one to ten, which would allow for greater differentiation in 
levels of endorsement (or non-endorsement) of existing comments. 
Such a system would permit individuals and the agency to see which 
contributions others deemed valuable. 
Indeed, the rating system could be set up so that the raters 
themselves were rated.15 Many websites use this model, allowing users 
to rate communications and allowing them also to rate other raters.16 
Perhaps the most successful use of such a system is Slashdot,17 a 
website that consists of technology-related news stories and 
comments on those stories.18 Slashdot begins with a filter—anyone 
can submit a story, but editors filter out the ones that they do not 
want to include. Once stories survive that filter, user-based ratings 
come to the fore: users submit comments on stories (often hundreds 
of comments), other users rate those comments, and some users—
designated as “moderators,” or meta-raters—rate other people’s 
ratings. The result is that a visitor to the Slashdot website can see at a 
glance what stories have been highly rated by people whose views are 
considered valuable by people who themselves have been judged to 
be good raters. 
 
 14. The “join” versus “endorse” distinction might matter a great deal to the creator of the 
original communication if the potential endorser was someone with whom the creator did not 
wish to associate. If, for example, a scientist writes a comment arguing for a particular position 
on scientific grounds, she might not be enthused about a self-identified member of the Flat 
Earth Society “joining” that comment, if joining meant having the Flat Earth member’s name 
listed alongside that of the creator. Mere endorsement, by contrast, presumably would not have 
the same connotation, because the endorsement would not entail actually joining, but instead 
would be a separate document of support. 
 15. If desired, the raters’ raters could be rated, and so on. 
 16. Amazon.com, for example, uses such a system. 
 17. www.slashdot.com. 
 18. Slashdot bills itself as “News for Nerds.” Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, Linux 
and the Nature of the Firm, 112 YALE L.J. 369, 393 (2002). 
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Slashdot users do not produce a final product or decision—
Slashdot just enables their comments and allows for ratings of them.19 
But individuals could work together toward a jointly produced 
submission to an agency. Agencies (or private entities) could allow 
individuals to post their concerns and solicit interest from others who 
might want to draft a shared comment. This would be akin to a 
bulletin board where a person could express a concern and seek co-
drafters of a comment. Entities could also foster collaboration by 
setting up the online collaborations themselves. Some existing 
computer programs allow for individual involvement, although most 
of those programs entail a relatively small group of individuals acting 
as “policy juries.”20 But there is a well-known existing model that 
allows any and all interested individuals to participate in a shared 
project—wikis. A wiki is an online collaboration to which anyone can 
contribute. The basic characteristic of wikis is that anyone can add or 
edit existing content.21 The best known, and probably the most 
successful wiki is Wikipedia.org, an open encyclopedia available on 
the Web. The idea behind wikis is the content equivalent of the 
programmer’s notion that “Given enough eyeballs, all bugs are 
shallow.”22 In the words of Wikipedia: “[O]ne of the great advantages 
of the Wiki system is that incomplete or poorly written first drafts of 
articles can evolve into polished, presentable masterpieces through 
the process of collaborative editing. This gives our approach an 
advantage over other ways of producing similar end-products.”23 
 
 19. “Regardless of [Slashdot’s] scalability, they do not structure decisions, just a series of 
conversations.” A. Michael Froomkin, Habermas@Discourse.Net: Toward a Critical Theory of 
Cyberspace, 116 HARV. L. REV. 749, 871 (2003). 
 20. Beth Noveck discusses some of these at length. See Noveck, Electronic Revolution, 
supra note 1, at 495–510 (2004) (discussing models for online citizen policy juries). 
 21. WikiWikiWeb, http://c2.com/cgi/wiki?WikiWikiWeb, is credited as the original Wiki. 
Froomkin, supra note 19, at 861. WikiWikiWeb allows anyone to add or change content. In 
2005, it instituted a delay, posting the following notice: 
Note to all wiki spammers: As of 1-2-2005 no changes to this wiki, either by editing or 
adding new pages, will be picked up by search engines until 10 hours have passed. All 
spam on this site is usually deleted in minutes, an hour at the most, so it is now 
pointless to try to add spam of any type to this wiki. 
Wiki Wiki Web Faq, http://www.c2.com/cgi/wiki?WikiWikiWebFaq (last visited July 10, 2006). 
 22. ERIC S. RAYMOND, THE CATHEDRAL AND THE BAZAAR: MUSINGS ON LINUX AND 
OPEN SOURCE BY AN ACCIDENTAL REVOLUTIONARY (2002). 
 23. Wikipedia Editing Policy, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Editing_policy (last visited July 
10, 2006). 
01__BENJAMIN.DOC 10/4/2006  1:08 PM 
902 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:893 
II.  WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL THESE CHANGES MAKE? 
So there are lots of proposals designed to use information 
technologies to increase citizen participation in rulemaking. What, 
exactly, would implementation of these proposals change? The most 
obvious set of changes, and the one on which commentators have 
focused, centers on the actions of individuals in the rulemaking 
process and agencies’ responses to them. As I shall discuss, that 
ignores other important actors, such as Congress and the courts. But I 
begin with the behavior of individuals, and the effect of that behavior 
on agencies. 
A. Impact on Ordinary Individuals’ Participation 
The proposed changes could have an enormous effect on 
individuals’ participation in agency rulemaking. The goal of the 
proposals is to make the rulemaking process more interactive, and it 
is entirely possible that ordinary individuals will respond 
enthusiastically to a more interactive process. Ordinary individuals 
might get actively involved in the rulemaking process—proposing 
language, responding to agency proposals, and responding to 
proposals from other commenters. Moreover, if the early adopters 
are excited about their involvement, they might encourage others to 
get involved, with the result that involvement in rulemaking would 
become a truly mass undertaking. 
Of course, it is possible that public participation will not increase 
significantly, even if all the proposals for changing rulemaking are 
implemented. The proposals lower the costs of participation, but it 
may be that relatively few people are sufficiently interested for this 
lowering of the barriers to their involvement to make a difference. I 
discuss the existing data in Part III.C; so far, the Internet has not 
significantly increased individual participation in the rulemaking 
process. Although this is disappointing for e-rulemaking advocates, 
the data do not rule out the possibility that the e-rulemaking 
initiatives will produce some increase in public participation. Indeed, 
it seems likely that, for some individuals, the decrease in the costs of 
their participation, combined with the promise of greater 
effectiveness, will make the difference between participating and not 
participating. 
New rulemakings are initiated every day, making this a multiple-
round interaction. As a result (and importantly), if the e-rulemaking 
initiatives result in a political groundswell among individuals with 
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respect to a given rule, and the government’s ultimate action seems to 
be positively affected by that groundswell, then one might expect 
both that the individuals will feel good about their participation and 
that the success of those individuals will persuade yet more 
individuals to participate.24 Put a bit differently, if the individuals gain 
pleasure from their participation in a successful movement (as seems 
quite plausible), then the prospect of that pleasure becomes an 
additional benefit to potential participants that might make the 
difference for those on the margin. There would be a virtuous circle 
of participation.25 
For better or worse, the converse is true: if e-rulemaking 
produces a groundswell that seems to make no difference in the 
ultimate action the government takes, that would probably tend to 
dampen enthusiasm, both among the new participants and among the 
potential participants at the margin, who now would not have an 
additional reason to join. Indeed, the frustration entailed in spending 
time on communications that have no impact on the agency might 
create a reason not to join. And the more this happened, the greater 
one would expect the dampening to be. The circle would be vicious, 
instead of virtuous, as fewer and fewer individuals saw much point in 
participating. 
This discussion highlights the importance of the other players in 
this process—agencies, Congress, and the courts. I now turn to that 
discussion. 
B. Impact on Agencies’ Rulemaking 
The e-rulemaking proposals could affect agencies in a number of 
ways. First, creating more ambitious mechanisms for meaningful 
interaction will consume agency resources. All but the most basic 
proposals will require that each agency reconfigure its website and 
alter its existing rulemaking procedures to some degree. This 
probably will not constitute a very great cost to the agency, but 
(unlike the costs I discuss below) it will exist whether or not 
participation increases. So if it turns out that implementation of these 
e-rulemaking proposals does not increase individuals’ participation, 
 
 24. By “ultimate action,” I mean to include not merely the rule the agency proffers, but 
also subsequent judicial review (if it occurs), and even congressional changes to the rule (which 
is unlikely but of course possible). I discuss Congress and the courts in the next section. 
 25. The virtue, here, is in the eye of the beholder—particularly based on one’s views of the 
desirability of individuals influencing agency behavior. See infra Part III.C. 
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the agency will have incurred costs without any compensating 
benefits. 
Assuming, though, that the proposals do increase public 
participation to at least some degree, there will be other impacts on 
the agency. Those impacts will depend on the nature of the additional 
communications that individuals send. 
1. Increases in Quantity Only.  It may be that implementing 
these proposals simply increases the quantity of messages without 
adding any new ideas. One way this could occur is if the entirety of 
the increase takes the form of individuals endorsing pre-existing 
messages (e.g., adding their names to a list of endorsers, or 
transmitting verbatim a form letter that was sent to them). If so, the 
cost to the agency would likely be small. As long as a computer 
program could pick up the fact that the new messages were identical 
to others that were received, the program could log those additional 
messages without any human having to read each of the duplicate 
messages. So, with any luck, the additional expenditure of resources 
would be modest. 
The impact on the agency would be greater, however, if messages 
were substantively identical but were formulated differently enough 
that the agency’s computer program did not recognize them as 
identical. If, for example, individuals did not send a form e-mail but 
instead composed their own messages making the same point (e.g., 
saying that raising the permissible level of soot would make it harder 
for people to breathe versus saying that an increase would adversely 
affect individuals’ respiration), then humans would have to read each 
message in order to determine if it presented any new ideas. In fact, 
“[i]nterest groups have been known to encourage their members to 
take steps to make it hard for an agency to treat a mass of comments 
as if they were just X number of form letters.”26 This need not occupy 
the time of any senior agency officials—indeed, agencies often farm 
out such reading to other entities. But if even one percent of the U.S. 
adult population commented on a given rulemaking, producing, say, a 
few hundred thousand comments that were sufficiently different to 
 
 26. Fred Emery & Andrew Emery, A Modest Proposal: Improve E-Rulemaking by 
Improving Comments, 30 ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS 8, 8 (Fall 2005), available at http://www. 
abanet.org/adminlaw/news/adlaw_fall2005.pdf. 
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require a human reader, the costs of plowing through those comments 
would be considerable.27 
The government might be able to reduce those costs to some 
degree insofar as programmers could increase the sophistication of 
the computer programs that read comments (although such programs 
would entail their own expenses) and could have confidence in the 
programs’ ability to make ever more discerning determinations as to 
which comments really were duplicative.28 But it is hard to imagine 
that any program could accurately find the vast majority of 
substantive overlaps (much less all of them), given that the words 
used might be so different. Once people started using their own 
idiosyncratic word formulations, it would be extraordinarily unlikely 
that any program could find all the overlaps. So the costs of having 
human readers will remain, even if they are somewhat reduced. 
What impact would an increase in quantity have on a given 
rulemaking? One way of looking at the question is to ask, what 
information does the agency receive that it would not already have? 
By hypothesis, it is hearing no new arguments or ideas. All it is 
learning is that X number of people felt strongly enough to 
participate. That has some significance if (a) the agency is unsure of 
public sentiment on the issue, (b) it concludes that the number of 
messages is a good indicator of public sentiment, and (c) it decides 
that public sentiment is relevant to its regulatory outcome. I doubt 
that all three of those conditions will obtain very often. If an agency 
wants to count noses, public opinion polls with randomized samples 
will give a more accurate count.29 That said, strength of preference has 
 
 27. I suggest a few hundred thousand different comments on the theory that there would 
be some duplication that a sophisticated computer program would recognize. If each member of 
my hypothetical one percent used his or her own words, or if five percent of the adult populace 
commented instead of that hypothetical one percent, then humans would have to read well over 
a million comments. 
 28. See generally Hui Yang & Jamie Callan, Near-Duplicate Detection for eRulemaking 
(Carnegie Mellon Univ. Language Tech. Inst., 2005), available at http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt. 
edu/doc/papers/dgo05-huiyang.pdf (discussing computer programs that should be able to detect 
form letters with very slight differences from the model form letter). 
 29. See Thomas C. Beierle, Discussing the Rules: Electronic Rulemaking and Democratic 
Deliberation 11 (Resources for the Future, Discussion Paper No. 03-22, 2003) (suggesting that e-
rulemaking may produce “a cacophony of unreflective comments [that] tempts rule writers to 
lapse into preference aggregation, counting up support and disagreement in an inappropriate 
application of a voting model”); Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 
55–56 (“[S]ystematic and substantial increases in citizen comments would shift regulators’ 
attention away from selecting the policy option that best fulfills their statutory mandate or the 
public interest, and instead lead regulators to strive to satisfy the views expressed by those who 
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some significance, and the number of messages will indicate 
something about strength of preferences—those who take the time to 
communicate are likely to have stronger feelings on the issue than the 
average person does. But there is a distinct possibility (maybe a 
probability) of a skewed sample of those who really care about the 
issue.30 For example, the average online commenters will tend to have 
higher than average wealth (as Web users more generally have higher 
than average wealth). In other ways, too, e-rulemaking participants 
may be a skewed sample. Maybe the rulemaking was publicized on 
websites frequented by people who are on one side of the issue and 
not publicized on websites frequented by people of the opposite view. 
Or maybe people with the opposite view tend not to frequent 
websites, or more simply tend not to use computers and thereby avail 
themselves of the e-rulemaking process. To pick an obvious example, 
a proposed regulation of online indecency is likely to attract 
comments from a population that is disproportionately opposed to 
such regulation, simply because it seems likely that opposition to such 
regulation would be positively correlated with use of the Web.31 And 
of course there is the potential for manipulation by interest groups32—
which, as I discuss in Part III, has already occurred with respect to e-
mail comments on proposed rulemakings.33 
Finally, even if the agency concludes that the number of 
messages is a good indicator of public sentiment, it may also conclude 
that such sentiment is irrelevant to its mission. Many statutes leave no 
 
file comments. This problem would move the process closer to making rules by plebiscite, which 
will risk giving undue prominence to expedient or even erroneous considerations.”). 
 30. Notably, in response to the FDA’s proposed regulation of cigarettes and smokeless 
tobacco there was “a massive tobacco company-orchestrated campaign [that] generated some 
300,000 pieces of mail – nearly half of all of the mail received by the agency on this topic.” 
Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless Tobacco to 
Protect Children and Adolescents, 61 Fed. Reg. 44,395, 44,418 n.34 (Aug. 28, 1996) (to be 
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 801). Such a concerted effort may reveal more about the organizing 
ability and wealth of those on one side of a regulation than it does about citizens’ strength of 
preference. 
 31. In this regard it is unsurprising that there was more organized opposition to the 
Communications Decency Act of 1996 among Web users than there was organized support for 
it. 
 32. See Peter Strauss, The ABA Ad Law Section’s E Rulemaking Survey, 29 ADMIN. & 
REG. L. NEWS 8, 10 (Spring 2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/adminlaw/news/ 
adlaw_spring2004.pdf (stating that “it is not hard to imagine manipulative campaigns exploiting 
tools of spam to proliferate comments dramatically”); Emery & Emery, supra note 26, at 8 
(noting that such a “rulemaking arms race” is already occurring). 
 33. See infra notes 102–04 and accompanying text. 
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room for an agency to consider public sentiment. When Congress tells 
an agency to regulate based on scientific findings,34 or based on its 
conclusions about the existence of harms to competition,35 or based 
on what a given set of companies would need in order to compete 
effectively in the marketplace,36 it does not leave a role for public 
opinion. In such situations, if an agency did consider public sentiment 
a reviewing court would likely find that it had acted unlawfully.37 
I am aware of no statute that actually directs an agency to 
consider the public’s views. Some statutes have language that might 
seem to permit the agency to consider the public’s views. Most 
notably, a number of agencies created in the New Deal era are 
directed to regulate certain areas consistent with “the public interest, 
convenience, or necessity.”38 But this language was used in statutes 
when the prevailing vision for agency heads was that they would be 
politically insulated experts who would act in what they concluded 
was the public interest and not in response to public sentiment.39 The 
 
 34. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 2643(d)(7) (2000) (requiring the collection and dissemination of 
information about asbestos “based on the best available scientific evidence,” which “shall be 
revised, republished, and redistributed as appropriate, to reflect new scientific findings”); 16 
U.S.C.A. § 669c(d)(1)(D) (2000) (requiring the development of a “wildlife conservation strategy 
based upon the best available and appropriate scientific information and data”). 
 35. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 761(a)(1) (2000) (providing that the FCC “may not issue a license 
or construction permit to any separated entity, or renew or permit the assignment or use of any 
such license or permit, or authorize the use by any entity subject to United States jurisdiction of 
any space segment owned, leased, or operated by any separated entity, unless the Commission 
determines that such issuance, renewal, assignment, or use will not harm competition in the 
telecommunications market of the United States”). 
 36. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2000) (“In determining what network elements should 
be made available . . . , the [FCC] shall consider, at a minimum, whether (A) access to such 
network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary; and (B) the failure to provide access 
to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking 
access to provide the services that it seeks to offer.”). 
 37. The irrelevance of public opinion to agencies’ legislative mandate does not, of course, 
mean that there is no role for comments from the public. The sections of the Administrative 
Procedure Act governing informal rulemaking put public comments at the center of the process. 
See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2000) (stating that agencies “shall give interested persons an opportunity to 
participate in the rulemaking through submission of written data, views, or arguments”). 
Congress’s directions to agencies as to the basis upon which they should act determines which 
arguments contained in those comments are relevant to the agency’s decision and which are not. 
Agencies will accept virtually any comments, in other words, but only some put forward 
arguments that are within the agency’s purview. 
 38. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (2000) (authorizing the FCC to regulate licenses consistent 
with “the public interest, convenience and necessity”). 
 39. See JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 28 (1938) (noting that the 
administrative process “promotes expertness . . . [which] makes for much more effective public 
responsibility”). On the centrality of Landis’ vision, and role, in the creation of New Deal 
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history of the implementation of that language has been that agencies 
have reached their own conclusions, and have not invoked public 
sentiment in support of their positions. I cannot exclude, of course, 
the possibility that the agencies were persuaded by public sentiment 
but declined to reveal this fact, but the agencies have not so indicated. 
One striking example was the Federal Communications 
Commission’s 2003 rulemaking on media ownership rules.40 The 
Commission received more than one million comments, 99.9 percent 
of which were opposed to its proposed rules.41 Nonetheless it 
promulgated those rules in largely the form it had proposed, by the 
exact 3–2 vote everyone expected.42 The overwhelming sentiment 
against the rules in the comments appears to have had no effect.43 
 
agencies authorized to act in the public interest, see generally DONALD M. RITCHIE, JAMES M. 
LANDIS: DEAN OF THE REGULATORS (1980). 
 40. In re 2002 Biennial Reg. Review--Review of the Comm’n’s Broad. Ownership Rules & 
Other Rules Adopted Pursuant to Sec. 202 of the Telecomm. Act of 1996, 18 F.C.C.R. 13,620 
(2003) [hereinafter 2003 FCC Ownership Order]. 
 41. See Prometheus Radio Project v. FCC, 373 F.3d 372, 386 (3d Cir. 2004) (“[N]early two 
million people weighed in by letters, postcards, e-mails, and petitions to oppose further 
relaxation of the [media ownership] rules.”); 2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 40, at 
13,957 (Copps, Comm’r, dissenting). As Commissioner Copps stated in his dissent to the 
Commission’s order (when the comments had not yet topped the one-million mark): 
This proceeding has generated three-quarters of a million comments now—more than 
any other proceeding that I am aware of in the history of the FCC. Of those 
comments, all but a few hundred are from individual citizens. And of those, nearly 
every one opposes increased media consolidation—over 99.9 percent! 
Id.; see also Jennifer 8. Lee, Deregulating the Media: Comments Showed Solid Opposition, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 3, 2003, at C8. (“More than 520,000 comments on the proceeding were sent in by 
citizens . . . . [and] nearly all of them were against relaxing media ownership rules.”). 
 42. This does not mean, however, that there was no point in so many people filing those 
comments. The need to wade through so many comments occupied a fair amount of time and 
thus may have slowed down the FCC. More importantly, the strategy of the leaders of the 
groups that pushed for the comments was to set up the FCC for reversal in the courts, not to 
change the FCC’s own decision. See infra note 63 and accompanying text. 
 43. Indeed, the FCC’s characterization of these comments so indicates. In its media 
ownership order (when it had received hundreds of thousands of comments, but not yet one 
million), the FCC stated that 
We received more than 500,000 brief comments and form letters from individual 
citizens. These individual commenters expressed general concerns about the potential 
consequences of media consolidation, including concerns that such consolidation 
would result in a significant loss of viewpoint diversity and affect competition. We 
share the concerns of these commenters that our ownership rules protect our critical 
diversity and competition goals, as they are designed to do, and we believe that the 
rules adopted herein serve our public interest goals, take account of and protect the 
vibrant media marketplace, and comply with our statutory responsibilities and limits. 
2003 FCC Ownership Order, supra note 40, at 13,624. The reference to “brief comments and 
form letters” and to the “general concerns” they contained, combined with the FCC’s response 
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2. Increases in Quality as Well as Quantity.  The larger goal of e-
rulemaking advocates is not merely more quantity, but also more 
quality. Ideally, as I noted above, individuals will put forward points 
that otherwise would not have been presented to the agency, or at 
least they will sharpen points that might otherwise have been lost in 
the mass of comments.44 
If that happens, the agency will obviously have to devote 
considerable human resources to sifting through the messages. By 
hypothesis, individuals are putting forward new points, or variations 
on points that others have made. To determine exactly what 
information these new participants are putting forth, the agency will 
need to have someone (or, more likely, a phalanx of people) reading 
the messages with some care. And as the sheer number of messages 
rises, the burdens of reading them rise. In this way, increasing the 
number of messages is at cross-purposes with the goal of sharpening 
points that would otherwise get lost in the shuffle: the larger the 
number of messages the agency must review, the greater the danger a 
powerful argument will be overlooked. The only way to avoid that 
problem is to devote substantial resources to the careful reading of 
each message—quite an undertaking if there are hundreds of 
thousands of nonduplicative messages. 
Significantly, these costs will arise whenever there are messages 
that a computer program cannot match as being identical—even if the 
nonduplicative messages in fact make identical points and thus add 
quantity without adding any new information. The agency cannot 
know a priori whether the messages that the program fails to match 
are merely using different words to make the same point, or instead 
are using different words to make a slightly different point. So the 
agency must carefully read all the messages that the program cannot 
match as duplicative, in order to ensure that it does not miss the new 
or different point. Accordingly, the costs outlined in the previous 
section are actually higher than they might first appear.45 
 
in the next sentence at a similarly high level of generality, do not inspire the sense that the FCC 
found these comments terribly helpful or influential. 
 44. An example of the latter would entail individuals finding a comment with which they 
agreed and making a similar argument more effectively. 
 45. This does not necessarily mean that costs per regulation would increase. It is possible 
that an increase in costs at one stage (here, the commenting process) will produce a greater 
reduction in costs at another stage (by reducing the time it takes to issue the rule, or the 
likelihood of litigation after the regulation is promulgated). In such a situation, the total costs 
per regulation would not increase. The problem is that there is neither evidence nor much 
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Note that increased costs per regulation mean that unless 
Congress increases the spending for agencies to cover these increased 
costs, agencies will be able to issue fewer regulations.46 They may 
pursue fewer regulations from the outset (if for each regulation an 
agency adds additional resources sufficient to cover the costs), or they 
may pursue the same number of regulations but then spend a longer 
time or more money promulgating each one, but the net result at the 
end of the day (or, more to the point, the end of an administration’s 
four-year term) will be fewer regulations. 
What difference will this new input make? Assuming it is 
relevant to the agency’s statutory mandate, it might make a big 
difference.47 If the additional messages put forward points that the 
agency would not have considered in the absence of those messages 
then they could help to shape the ultimate regulation. Two basic 
conditions are necessary for this to occur: (a) the points must be ones 
that the agency would not have received from other sources, or 
thought of on its own; and (b) they must actually persuade the 
agency—or at least persuade a court that the agency should have 
taken them more seriously (I take up this latter possibility in the next 
section). 
 
reason to support this proposition, and some evidence that cuts the other way. As for the 
reasoning, I am talking here about an agency devoting more resources to determining the 
content of messages. There is no reason to expect that spending more time reading messages 
will systematically shorten, or otherwise make more efficient, the regulatory process. Nor will 
the fact of reading additional input from individuals tend to reduce litigation against the agency, 
unless (a) the agency changes its regulation in accordance with the wishes of that additional 
input (an assumption that I discuss next), (b) the people placated by that change would have 
challenged the regulation, and would have been the only ones to do so, and (c) the change does 
not aggrieve a new set of potential litigants who are at least as likely to bring litigation. As for 
the evidence, as I discuss shortly, negotiated rulemaking was designed to let stakeholders reach 
a consensus about regulations before the notice and comment process began, in the expectation 
that this would shorten the notice and comment process and reduce the likelihood of litigation. 
The actual experience with negotiated rulemaking, however, has been that it does neither. See 
infra notes 67–70 and accompanying text. 
 46. And, of course, even if Congress does increase agencies’ funding to cover the costs, that 
money has to come from somewhere—either from cuts in other programs or from additional 
borrowing or taxation. 
 47. If, in response to a regulation mandating that an agency reduce the emissions of a 
minor pollutant “to the extent feasible,” Person A sends an irrelevant message (e.g., “Please do 
not regulate this pollutant, because I like inhaling it” or “Please reduce emissions to X level, 
because otherwise I’ll die in the next few days”), and Person B then makes a slightly different 
argument (e.g., “Many people like to inhale this pollutant, so please keep the level reasonably 
high” or “Many people fear this pollutant, so please ban it to allay their concerns”), these 
messages are still irrelevant to the statutory mandate. The additional argument does not give 
the agency useful guidance. 
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As for the first point, there is reason to doubt. First, for any 
major agency action, there are dozens of interested parties who are 
well-paid to find every point that can help their side—and virtually 
every side is represented. That said, most existing commenters 
represent interest groups, and it may be that even groups styling 
themselves as representing ordinary people or consumers’ interests in 
fact fail to do so.48 In particular, the existing commenters may tend to 
underproduce both public goods themselves (e.g., data that are in the 
public’s interest) and arguments supporting the creation of public 
goods. But interest groups that oppose a regulation know that they, 
like all commenters, should couch their comments to the agency in 
terms of the public interest, as both the statutory mandate and the 
political realities call for such arguments. So the question is whether 
an interest group that strongly opposes a proposed regulation for self-
regarding reasons will put forward all the public-regarding data and 
arguments that a new individual commenter might want to bring 
forward. To put the proposition differently, it may be that the 
additional participants enabled by e-rulemaking would find that their 
“new” public-regarding points had in fact already been made to the 
agency by other commenters, even though those other commenters 
might have acted in their own private interests. 
Second, the agency itself may have thought of the points that the 
additional individual participants would make. After all, the agency is 
generally supposed to act in the public interest, and presumably the 
reason the agency proposed the regulation in the first place is that it 
recognized the public interest considerations in favor of its plan.49 
Third, if neither existing commenters nor the agency would have 
 
 48. See William Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation and the 
Public Interest—EPA’s Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 95 (1987) (“The [Consumer 
Federation of America] may have represented the interests associated with the mentality of a 
Consumers Reports reader, but it did not appear to lobby on behalf of poor, rural folk for whom 
the rule will provide little benefit and perhaps significant burden.”); Mark Tushnet, Foreword: 
The New Constitutional Order and the Chastening of Constitutional Aspiration, 113 HARV. L. 
REV. 29, 79 n.240 (1999) (“[S]o-called public interest groups . . . . are staffed and funded by the 
relatively well-to-do, and their programs are determined by what the professional elites perceive 
to be the interests of the persons on whose behalf they are acting.”); C. Frederick Beckner, III, 
Note, The FDA’s War on Drugs, 82 GEO. L.J. 529, 548 (1993) (“[Many] self-styled public 
interest groups do not represent the interests of the public as a whole, but instead exploit 
consumer fear in order to aggrandize the political power necessary for their existence.”). 
 49. For those readers who think the previous sentence is fanciful or hopelessly naive, 
because agencies are captured, then the additional messages enabled by e-rulemaking may 
make new points, but they are likely to be disregarded by the captured agency. See infra note 50 
and accompanying text. 
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come up with a particular point on its own, the question remains 
whether the additional increment of participants enabled by e-
rulemaking would do so. One’s answer about the likelihood of new 
input ultimately depends, then, on one’s sense of the degree to which 
interest groups and agencies really do put forward all the relevant 
points, and, if they do not, the realistic chances that the new 
participants enabled by e-rulemaking will, in fact, add relevant points. 
If the existing participants fail to represent public-regarding views but 
new participants would represent them, then the first condition would 
be satisfied. 
Note that the points in the preceding paragraph about 
participants and agencies focus on public-regarding arguments and 
data. That does not exhaust the additional information that the new 
participants under e-rulemaking might offer. They may submit 
additional input that is not public regarding, but instead advances 
their own private interests or their own idiosyncratic views. If the 
additional increment of messages is so composed, this raises questions 
about the normative value of such input and the chances that such 
input will affect the agency in desirable ways. 
Turning to the second question noted above (whether the new 
information persuades the agency), the answer depends on how 
agencies actually operate. How often are agencies convinced by 
arguments and data put forward in formal messages (as opposed to 
informal communications that occur outside the agencies’ routinized 
processes, or direction from political actors)? Note that many 
commentators have argued that the influential communications to 
agencies occur outside the rulemaking process delineated by the 
Administrative Procedure Act. In Don Elliott’s words, 
“Notice-and-comment rulemaking is to public participation as 
Japanese Kabuki theater is to human passions—a highly stylized 
process for displaying in a formal way the essence of something which 
in real life takes place in other venues.”50 But also note that part of 
the goal of e-rulemaking is to change that dynamic—to make 
individual participation more useful and relevant to agencies. The 
question is whether the additional increment of messages that e-
rulemaking generates will in fact create that change. 
 
 50. E. Donald Elliott, Comment, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1492 
(1992). 
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This inquiry about the degree to which agencies are persuaded 
by comments is part of a larger inquiry that is central to the question 
of the effectiveness of the new participation enabled by e-rulemaking: 
are agencies so influenced by powerful political and/or industry forces 
that the public-regarding arguments made by the new participants 
will not persuade the agency? If agencies are captured by powerful 
interest groups, or controlled by political forces, then the additional 
messages will just be flotsam for the agency to disregard. 
Putting the first question (will individuals add new information?) 
with the second (will agencies be persuaded?) highlights the 
prediction of many theories of agency behavior that the likelihood of 
a significant impact from the additional messages is fairly low. If the 
agency is captured, then the additional messages will not make a 
difference. And if the agency is acting in a public-regarding manner 
and is reasonably competent, then one should expect it to come up 
with the good public-regarding arguments and data on its own. One 
can tell a story in which the new messages might make a difference—
maybe the agency is so understaffed that no one creating the rule has 
the time to think of the public-regarding considerations (but, if so, on 
what basis did they propose the regulation in the first place?), or 
maybe (less implausibly) the agency staffers are not smart enough to 
come up with the good arguments and data on their own but are 
smart enough to recognize them when they are made by others. 
Simply put, many theories of agency behavior would suggest that the 
additional participation enabled by e-rulemaking will not, in the end, 
change agency behavior. 
C. Impact on Congress and the Courts 
As I noted above, commentators have largely focused on the 
potential impact of e-rulemaking initiatives on the citizenry and on 
agencies’ behavior in response. This focus is understandable—after 
all, the agencies promulgate the rules. But the matter often does not 
end there. In some situations, Congress countermands the agency’s 
action. Admittedly, such congressional intervention is rare. Much 
more common, of course, is a challenge to the legality of a rule by an 
aggrieved party, which entails judicial review of the agency action. 
1. Congress.  Depending on what actually motivates members 
of Congress, it is possible that an enhanced role for the Internet in 
rulemaking will lead to more frequent congressional rejections of 
agency actions. If (a) agencies make rulemaking more open to 
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citizens’ electronic participation, with the result that in at least some 
cases citizens mobilize more than they would have in the absence of 
such electronic participation; and (b) if that greater mobilization leads 
those citizens to lobby Congress about that rule more effectively than 
they would have in the absence of their electronic participation; and 
(c) if such increased mobilization can be the difference between 
congressional action and congressional inaction on the rule, then e-
rulemaking may indeed produce congressional actions that reject or 
modify agency rulemakings after they are issued. 
The idea behind e-rulemaking is that citizens will become more 
involved in the process. Such a result is not obvious, but it is certainly 
possible.51 Thus the first element of this causal chain seems 
reasonable. The second element is reasonable, too, in that it requires 
only that citizens be a bit more effective in lobbying Congress. The 
biggest problem is in the third element. It is one thing for e-
rulemaking to lead to somewhat more effective lobbying by Congress, 
and quite another for that increase to be the difference between 
congressional action and inaction. This is particularly so in light of the 
rarity of post-issuance congressional actions that countermand or 
modify agency rulemakings.52 So even if e-rulemaking does have some 
effect on the margin of congressional behavior after rules are issued, 
such an effect might not lead to any more congressional rejections or 
modifications of agency rulemakings. That is, the paucity of successful 
 
 51. As I discuss in Part III, the evidence so far suggests that e-rulemaking initiatives have 
not produced an increase in individual involvement in the rulemaking process. If an increase in 
citizen participation does not, in fact, materialize, that presents a challenge not merely to a 
suggestion of congressional involvement but more fundamentally to the desirability of e-
rulemaking initiatives in the first place. See infra Part III. 
 52. Before INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), was decided, Congress routinely included 
and acted upon legislative vetoes in legislation, which allowed one or both houses of Congress 
to reverse agency actions. Id. at 968 (White, J., dissenting) (“[O]ver the past five decades, the 
legislative veto has been placed in nearly 200 statutes.”). After Chadha, the difficulty of passing 
congressional legislation rejecting or modifying agency actions led Congress to pass legislation 
creating an expedited process for Congress to respond to agency decisions. See Contract with 
America Advancement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–121, §§ 251–253, 110 Stat. 847, 868–74 
(1996) (codified at 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2000)). That legislation raised the prospect of 
Congress’s countermanding many agency actions, but in fact it has been successfully used only 
once since its enactment (to overturn ergonomic rules imposed on workplaces). See GARY 
LAWSON, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 108 (3d ed. 2004) (discussing the legislation and 
noting the rarity of its use); Morton Rosenberg, Whatever Happened to Congressional Review of 
Agency Rulemaking?: A Brief Overview, Assessment, and Proposal for Reform, 51 ADMIN L. 
REV. 1051, 1052 (1999) (same); Julie A. Parks, Lessons in Politics: Initial Use of the 
Congressional Review Act, 55 ADMIN. L. REV. 187, 188–89 (2003) (discussing the one successful 
utilization of the congressional review process). 
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cases may also indicate that there are precious few marginal cases, 
such that e-rulemaking will in fact play out little differently from 
ordinary rulemaking in Congress. 
Congress directs agencies ex ante with much greater frequency. 
Might e-rulemaking have an effect on congressional action that 
shapes the action the agency will ultimately take? The short answer is 
that there is little reason to suppose so. The idea behind e-rulemaking 
is that citizens will become more engaged in the agency’s rulemaking 
on a given issue. One could imagine that some of these citizens will 
become interested in the agency’s workings more generally and thus 
will pressure their members of Congress to direct the agency’s future 
actions in a particular way, but that is a much more tenuous 
connection. The big change promised by e-rulemaking proponents is 
that it dramatically lowers the costs of participation in rulemaking for 
citizens. But it doesn’t dramatically lower the costs of citizens 
educating themselves about the business of the agency. Online 
availability of agency regulations, and the possibilities for e-mail 
communication among concerned citizens, may lower the costs of 
citizens educating themselves, but those technologies are already in 
place. 
2. Courts.  The branch that regularly responds to agency 
rulemakings is of course the judiciary, not the legislative branch. 
Agency rulemakings frequently do not end at the agency, but instead 
are challenged by an aggrieved party and reviewed by federal courts.53 
 
 53. The exact percentage of agency rules that are challenged in court is not clear. The most 
fulsome debate has revolved around EPA rulemakings. Many commentators have suggested 
that 80 percent to 85 percent of EPA rulemakings are subject to challenge, but the better 
estimates appear to be that the number is lower—closer to a quarter of all EPA rules and a third 
of major EPA rules. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing Consensus: The Promise and Performance 
of Negotiated Rulemaking, 46 DUKE L.J. 1255, 1298–1301 (1997) (finding that 26 percent of all 
EPA rules issued from 1987 to 1991 and 35 percent of major EPA rules issued from 1980 to 1991 
were challenged in court); Christopher H. Schroeder & Robert L. Glicksman, Chevron, State 
Farm, and EPA in the Courts of Appeals During the 1990s, [2001] 31 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. Law 
Inst.) 10,371, 10,375 (Apr. 2001) (reporting that 33 percent of EPA major rules issued during the 
1990s were challenged in court). But see Richard J. Lazarus, The Tragedy of Distrust in the 
Implementation of Federal Environmental Law, 54 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 311, 334 (Autumn 
1991) (“Both environmental organizations and industry took advantage of the increased judicial 
access and together challenged between 80 and 85 percent of EPA’s major decisions.”); 
Coglianese, supra, at app. D (collecting assertions that 80 percent of EPA rulemakings were 
subject to challenge). 
Significantly, those who are in the agencies apparently believe the higher numbers. See 
Seidenfeld, Cognitive Loafing, Social Conformity, and Judicial Review of Agency Rulemaking, 
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If e-rulemaking develops as its proponents suggest, it could have a 
significant impact on this judicial review. 
In the previous section I noted that increases in the quality of 
messages must either persuade the agency or persuade a court that 
the agency should have taken them more seriously. In that section I 
discussed persuading the agency, and now I turn to persuading a 
court. 
A central element in judicial review of agency actions is the 
question of whether the agency adequately considered relevant 
materials. This arises to some degree in courts’ review of agencies’ 
factual findings. Courts will reject agency fact-finding under the 
relevant standard (“arbitrary [or] capricious”54 in the context of 
informal rulemakings and adjudications, “substantial evidence”55 for 
formal rulemakings and adjudications) if the agency ignores evidence 
that undercuts the agency’s position. But rejections of rulemakings 
based on infirm factual findings are relatively rare. The more 
common basis for rejecting a rulemaking is that an agency’s policy 
decision was “arbitrary [or] capricious”—a standard that is 
implemented via “hard look” review.56 Under such review, a court will 
invalidate an agency action if the court determines that the agency 
failed to take a hard look at the significant considerations against its 
position.57 If an agency fails to offer an adequate explanation for its 
 
87 CORNELL L. REV. 486, 514 (2002) (“[T]here is a general perception, shared by those who 
study judicial review of administrative rules and those in the agencies, that most rules are 
subject to challenge.”). More importantly, agency members do not know, in advance, which 
rules will be challenged. So, once a significant percentage of rules are challenged, agency 
members know that they need to write the rule to be prepared for future judicial review. As 
Professor Mark Seidenfeld noted, “there is good reason to believe that rulemaking staff at many 
agencies do worry from the outset about pleasing a court should the rule be challenged, and 
therefore do not commit to an outcome before taking such review into account.” Id. 
 54. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A),(C) (2000). 
 55. See NLRB v. Universal Camera Corp., 340 U.S. 474, 477–91 (1951) (delineating the 
“substantial evidence” standard of review for findings of fact in formal agency proceedings). 
 56. See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 
(1983) (finding that the “arbitrary [or] capricious” standard of § 706(2)(A) applies to agency 
policy determinations and adopting hard look review); El Conejo Americano Inc. v. Dep’t of 
Transp., 278 F.3d 17, 19–20 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (applying the “hard look” standard). 
 57. As the Supreme Court elaborated in State Farm, 
The scope of review under the “arbitrary and capricious” standard is narrow and a 
court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. Nevertheless, the agency 
must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action 
including a “rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.” . . . 
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has relied on factors 
which Congress has not intended it to consider, entirely failed to consider an 
important aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
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rejection of such countervailing considerations, or promulgates a 
regulation that fails to take into account relevant factors, a court will 
invalidate the action.58 
The changes to rulemaking discussed in the previous sections 
could have a significant impact upon hard look review, and thus upon 
the likelihood of a court’s rejecting an agency’s action. The 
significance of adding more people to the process has two 
ramifications for judicial review of agencies. First, it produces more 
sheer data. More communications to the agency mean more material 
for the agency to digest.59 Second, those additional data mean more 
ideas that a court might find to be alternatives at which the agency 
should have taken a hard look. 
As I have noted, it is the hope and expectation of those who are 
excited about the possibilities for e-rulemaking that people will not 
simply check a pre-existing box, or e-mail the same form letter that 
every other individual is sending, but instead will contribute new 
ideas. If that happens, agencies will have new points to consider.60 
What this means for aggrieved parties is that, if they discover a 
comment that they believe is significant but that the agency did not 
carefully consider, they will likely bring this to the court’s attention. 
More substantive comments thus present more opportunities for 
litigants to find something the agency overlooked. They also provide 
more opportunities to find an area of disagreement (as to the 
significance of an argument against the rule) between the agency and 
the reviewing court. 
The point about overlooking a comment is straightforward: if the 
agency receives a hundred thousand comments, it may simply miss a 
good argument presented in one of them. As to potential 
 
counter to the evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be 
ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency expertise. 
State Farm, 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 168 
(1962)). Thus, an agency’s failure to respond to alternatives to its regulation or arguments that 
undercut its action is “arbitrary [or] capricious” within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 
 58. Sierra Club v. EPA, 356 F.3d 296 (D.C. Cir. 2004), provides a useful instantiation (and 
discussion) of the differences between Chevron deference and hard look review, id. at 306–07. 
 59. This is not necessarily a bad thing, of course; I discuss its desirability in the next section. 
See infra Part III. 
 60. If there are no additional participants, then e-rulemaking will have produced little 
benefit and nontrivial costs. See supra Part II. If there are additional participants but they do not 
contribute any new ideas, the agency will learn only that a bunch of people “voted” (via an e-
mailed message) a particular way. I discuss the limited value of such a blunt signal in the 
previous section. See supra notes 29–43 and accompanying text. 
01__BENJAMIN.DOC 10/4/2006  1:08 PM 
918 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 55:893 
disagreements, courts and agencies do not always concur as to 
whether a given argument is significant enough or a given alternative 
is sufficiently viable to require the agency to take a hard look. An 
increase in new substantive communications translates into an 
increase in the likelihood that the agency and the court will disagree 
about the necessity of the agency’s considering one point that a 
participant puts forward. Just one such failure can be fatal to a 
regulation. When an agency declines to take a hard look at a 
participant’s proposal but the court decides that the agency should 
have done so, the court will find the regulation unlawful.61 
Interest groups are well aware of this, of course. In fact, interest 
groups are often confident that their input will not affect the agency’s 
action, but submit comments in an attempt to slow the agency down 
and, more importantly, to create a record that will lead to judicial 
invalidation of the agency’s action. Indeed, this apparently was the 
case in the rulemaking that prodded more comments from individuals 
than any other—the FCC’s proposed rule relaxing some media 
ownership limits. More than a million individuals filed comments on 
the proposed rulemaking (99.9 percent in opposition to it).62 The 
leaders of the opposition, however, had no expectation that these 
comments would affect the FCC. Instead, they saw them as an 
opportunity to place in the record arguments and data that they could 
invoke in the inevitable judicial challenge to the FCC’s actions, as 
well as an opportunity to engage in political mobilization that might 
influence Congress to reverse the media ownership rules after the 
 
 61. The finding of unlawfulness will frequently entail the court invalidating the regulation, 
but in some cases the court will find the regulation unlawful but nonetheless remand the matter 
without vacating the regulation. This practice is controversial, both as to its permissibility under 
5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (which provides that a reviewing court “shall . . . hold unlawful and set 
aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be . . . arbitrary, capricious”) and as to its 
desirability as a policy matter. Compare Checkosky v. SEC, 23 F.3d 452, 462–66 (D.C. Cir. 1994) 
(Silberman, J., separate opinion) (supporting remand without vacation under certain 
circumstances), with id. at 490–93 (Randolph, J., separate opinion) (rejecting the legality of 
remand without vacation); compare Milk Train, Inc. v. Veneman, 310 F.3d 747, 755–56 (D.C. 
Cir. 2002) (ordering remand without vacation), with id. at 757–58 (Sentelle, J., dissenting) 
(rejecting the legality of remand without vacation); compare Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at 
Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 360–
63 (2003) (defending the attractiveness of remand without vacation), with Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Of Gift Horses and Great Expectations: Remands Without Vacatur in Administrative Law, 36 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 599, 601 (2004) (contending that remand with vacation is unattractive). 
 62. See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
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FCC had issued them.63 The intended audience for their comments, in 
other words, was the other two branches of government (and in 
particular the courts). 
This has enormous consequences for agencies. Either an agency 
will have to devote substantially more resources to its rulemaking 
process, or there will be a much greater likelihood of a court 
invalidating the regulation. As to the resources, I noted above that 
having lots of extra messages that a computer program cannot 
identify as duplicative will consume agency resources, because 
someone will have to read them. It might seem tempting to say that 
the extra costs to the agency will not be that great, because it can give 
those extra messages pretty short shrift (which, of course, undercuts 
the value of having them in the first place). But the significance of 
hard look review is that giving them short shrift increases the chances 
that a court will invalidate the regulation. In an era when significant 
rulemakings take about three years from start to finish, the costs of 
invalidation are pretty high. So the looming possibility of judicial 
review means that agencies really will need to read all those extra 
messages, to avoid overlooking important arguments and data. 
But reading the comments is not sufficient, and seriously 
considering all the input that a reviewing court will later find to be 
significant is even more costly. It is one thing to hire more comment-
readers, and another entirely to require the agency officials who are 
crafting the regulation to show that they have taken a hard look at the 
raft of arguments and data. The usual demonstration of the agency’s 
hard look appears in the agency’s explanation of its regulation—the 
agency explains why X option is not attractive, or why Y argument is 
not persuasive. In the absence of such an explicit discussion in its 
explanation of its rule, the agency would need to be able to prove to 
the court that it had, indeed, given serious consideration to these 
other options—a demonstration that would probably occupy even 
more resources than would a discussion in its justification for its rule. 
The bottom line is that if lots of new ideas come forward, the agency 
will find that its officials in charge of the rulemaking will have to 
 
 63. Interview with Mark Cooper, Director of Research, Consumer Fed’n of America, in 
Durham, N.C. (Sept. 24, 2005); Interview with Michael Weisman, Co-Director, Reclaim the 
Media, in Durham, N.C. (Sept. 24, 2005). 
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devote substantially more energy to responding to the ideas it has 
rejected.64 
But maybe that is a good thing. The previous paragraphs focus 
on the costs to the agency, but maybe those costs are benefits to the 
general public. After all, perhaps the new input will persuade the 
agency (as the previous section discussed), or should have persuaded 
it (in which case judicial invalidation of the rule would be welcome). 
More generally, maybe policymakers should embrace the changes 
that e-rulemaking would bring about, despite the costs. 
III.  EVALUATING THESE POTENTIAL CHANGES TO THE 
RULEMAKING PROCESS 
The modest literature on e-rulemaking has devoted most of its 
energy to the two issues discussed above—how might interactive use 
of the Internet be integrated into the rulemaking process, and what 
changes would adoption of these proposals likely produce—while 
devoting considerably less energy to the more fundamental question 
of whether the benefits of those changes outweigh the costs.65 How 
should one evaluate the desirability of implementing these proposals? 
I now turn to this latter, crucial question. 
A. If Additional Participation Does Not Result in Changes to the 
Agency’s Decision 
If the additional input enabled by the e-rulemaking initiatives 
would not change the substantive decisions that agencies make, 
should policymakers nonetheless embrace those initiatives? At first 
blush, the answer would be no: As I noted in Part II.B, combing 
through additional messages imposes some costs, and by hypothesis 
the messages would have no effect on the agency’s actions. 
 
 64. It is possible that courts (or Congress) will react to agencies’ difficulties in responding 
to all the new arguments in comments by relaxing the requirements of hard look review. That is, 
judges or legislators might find that a massive increase in the number of arguments to which an 
agency must respond imposes significantly higher costs without corresponding benefits, and thus 
relax the requirement that agencies in fact take a hard look at all significant arguments against 
their regulation. If so, then e-rulemaking will have had a profound effect on the review of 
agency rulemakings. The desirability of such a change (which is, of course, purely speculative) is 
beyond the scope of this paper. 
 65. Professor Coglianese is an exception, but even he discusses only briefly the question of 
the desirability of increasing public participation. Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation, 
supra note 1, at 55–57. 
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This calculus does not take into account the potential benefits to 
participants from their participation. Some commentators have 
suggested that face-to-face deliberation has benefits for participants 
that might also apply to e-rulemaking—making participants feel that 
their views have been heard, helping them to understand others’ 
positions and perhaps changing their own views (or changing the 
views of others), and, maybe most important, making them into more 
engaged citizens.66 On this last point, theorists have for years decried 
Americans’ relative lack of involvement in policy debates. E-
rulemaking could change this as to specific rulemakings: 
communications to an agency on a particular issue are one form of 
citizen engagement. But e-rulemaking also could work on a larger 
level. One goal of e-rulemaking proponents (and advocates of greater 
deliberation more generally) is to energize citizens into becoming 
involved in debates beyond those at issue in a given rulemaking—to 
become active, engaged citizens more generally. This would be 
valuable not only to those particular citizens but also to society as a 
whole: this greater involvement would be a public good. 
Recall, though, that I am positing that the public’s participation 
has no impact on an agency’s decision. It is, of course, possible that 
the individuals who participate will gain pleasure from their 
participation, even if it makes no difference to the outcome. But it 
seems at least as likely that (as I noted in Part II.B), once they realize 
their comments are not having any impact, they will become 
frustrated. More specifically, whatever benefits they receive from 
feeling that their views have been heard will be mitigated by their 
awareness that the hearing of their views did not translate into any 
change in the agency’s position. By contrast, the possibilities of 
individuals understanding others’ views, and changing their own 
minds or others’, exist independently of the impact of citizens’ 
communications on an agency. As long as individuals have a 
meaningful back-and-forth among themselves, such understanding 
and persuasion is possible. But this means that the likelihood of this 
understanding and persuasion depends on the degree to which the e-
rulemaking initiatives allow for meaningful interchanges among 
 
 66. See id. at 39–40 (noting that “public participation can be viewed as intrinsically valuable 
for citizens themselves, for such participation fosters important personal virtues”); Stuart W. 
Shulman et al., Electronic Rulemaking: A Public Participation Research Agenda for the Social 
Sciences, 21 SOC. SCI. COMP. REV. 162, 167–73 (2003) (proposing that electronic rulemaking 
may foster a more discursive democracy through greater public participation in the process). 
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participants and the degree to which people use them. I will discuss 
the former in the next section, so I set that aside here. As to the 
degree to which people would use such interactive e-rulemaking 
tools, that would likely depend in significant part on whether 
participants became frustrated once they realized that agencies were 
not responding to their input. This point also applies to the last, and 
biggest, benefit to individuals and society from individuals’ 
participation (i.e., producing engaged citizens). If participants are 
demoralized rather than energized, then the optimistic vision of an 
engaged citizenry will not materialize. My own guess is that there 
might be a short-term increase in engagement (and benefits to 
society, in the form of energized citizens and understanding and 
persuasion of others), but that this increase would dissipate after the 
ineffectuality of the individuals’ attempts to persuade the agency 
became apparent. 
It is interesting to contrast e-rulemaking with negotiated 
rulemaking. In negotiated rulemaking, agencies begin a rulemaking 
by establishing a committee comprising representatives from 
regulated firms, trade associations, citizen groups, and other affected 
organizations, as well as members of the agency staff. The idea is that, 
with the stakeholders meeting together around a table, they might be 
able to reach a consensus, resulting in a rulemaking process that 
would be much speedier and much less likely to produce litigation 
(because the stakeholders would have already agreed to the rule). 
Negotiated rulemaking turned out not to produce those results, 
and more generally not to be as successful as its advocates had hoped. 
Rules generated through negotiated rulemaking take just as long to 
promulgate as rules generated without it, and are no less likely to be 
litigated.67 There was a small study (comparing the reactions of 
 
 67. See Steven J. Balla & John R. Wright, Consensual Rule Making and the Time It Takes 
to Develop Rules, in POLITICS, POLICY, AND ORGANIZATIONS: FRONTIERS IN THE SCIENTIFIC 
STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY 187, 204 (George A. Krause & Kenneth J. Meier eds., 2003) (“Our 
research demonstrates . . . that rules to which regulatory negotiation was applied took longer to 
issue than those developed through conventional proceedings, despite the fact that agencies 
were more likely to conduct regulatory negotiations in situations that were amenable to 
relatively rapid resolution. In general, we find no evidence that consensual rule making reduces 
the time it takes to develop rules.”); Coglianese, supra note 53, at 1335 (“Negotiated rulemaking 
does not appear any more capable of limiting regulatory time or avoiding litigation than do the 
rulemaking procedures ordinarily used by agencies. The agency that has used negotiated 
rulemaking the most, the EPA, has not seen its negotiated rules emerge in final form any sooner 
than rules not subject to formal negotiation. Once promulgated, negotiated rules still find 
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participants in six conventional rulemakings with participants in eight 
negotiated rulemakings) that found that participants in the negotiated 
rulemakings had higher levels of satisfaction with the process, found 
the process more instructive, and believed that they had generated 
better quality rules.68 The significance of this study was mitigated by 
its small scale and some significant methodological questions about it, 
but it does suggest some benefits to negotiated rulemaking.69 In any 
event, many commentators have concluded that the benefits of 
negotiated rulemaking do not outweigh the costs (given that 
negotiated rulemaking does not speed up rulemakings or reduce the 
likelihood of litigation).70 
Here, by hypothesis, e-rulemaking does not generate better 
rules—or even change the rules.71 It thus seems quite unlikely that e-
 
themselves subject to legal challenge. The litigation rate for negotiated rules issued by the EPA 
has actually been higher than that for other significant EPA rules.”). 
 68. Laura I. Langbein & Cornelius M. Kerwin, Regulatory Negotiation versus Conventional 
Rule Making: Claims, Counterclaims, and Empirical Evidence, 10 J. PUB. ADMIN. RES. & 
THEORY 599, 625 (2000). 
 69. See Cary Coglianese, Assessing the Advocacy of Negotiated Rulemaking: A Response to 
Philip Harter, 9 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 386, 431 (2001): 
Langbein and Kerwin report that of all the types of participants in negotiated 
rulemakings, the representatives from EPA and state government gave negotiated 
rulemaking the highest overall ratings. This is important to recognize because 
approximately eleven percent of the negotiated rulemaking participants they 
interviewed were EPA officials and approximately twenty-five percent were 
representatives from state and local government. In contrast, the sample of 
individuals who filed comments in conventional rulemakings obviously included no 
one from EPA and included only three representatives from state and local 
government. Thus, approximately thirty-six percent of the respondents from 
negotiated rulemakings were individuals who might be considered ‘enthusiasts,’ given 
their higher overall ratings, while only approximately six percent of the comparison 
group were. 
Id. 
 70. See Coglianese, supra note 53, at 1261 (“Despite all the postulations about how 
negotiated rulemaking will save time and eliminate litigation, the procedure so far has not 
proven itself superior to the informal rulemaking that agencies ordinarily use.”); Funk, supra 
note 48, at 96–97 (arguing that negotiated rulemaking undermines the principles and values of 
administrative rulemaking by changing an agency’s objective from serving the public interest to 
seeking consensus among private parties); Mark Seidenfeld, Empowering Stakeholders: Limits 
on Collaboration as the Basis for Flexible Regulation, 41 WM. & MARY L. REV. 411, 513 (2000) 
(arguing that collaborative regulation cannot help to solve existing regulatory shortcomings 
because “they can succeed in overcoming the adversarial propensities of at least some 
stakeholders only within narrow regulatory environments”). 
 71. It also bears noting that with e-rulemaking the new participants do not meet face to 
face with each other. The point of e-rulemaking is to allow people to communicate through the 
Internet, rather than face to face. Although this may have many advantages, it obviously does 
not include the experience of physically meeting together as a community and reaching 
conclusions around a table. 
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rulemaking would generate even the modest benefits associated with 
negotiated rulemaking (absent an effect on the agency’s rules). This is 
not to say that participation for the sake of participation has no value. 
Rather, its value is likely to be low over time—especially once 
participants realize that their participation is not making a 
difference.72 
And, as I have discussed, the costs for the agency are likely to be 
considerable. The bottom line is that, unless an agency’s position 
changes as a result of e-rulemaking, it seems hard to justify. 
B. If Additional Input Does Affect the Agency’s Decision 
Let’s now consider the possibility that the additional input does 
affect the agency’s action. This is the scenario that advocates of e-
rulemaking hope for—individuals participate in the rulemaking 
process more significantly than they have in the past, and this 
additional involvement influences the substance of agency 
regulations. The advocates often assume that such public influence 
would be beneficial, but that is far from clear. More important, it 
implicates one of the central debates in administrative law: should 
agencies be influenced by, or insulated from, input from the public? 
Many key figures in administrative law have argued that agencies 
should not respond to outside forces but should be guided instead 
solely by their expertise and independent judgment. They contend 
that the questions before the agencies should, and do, turn on 
technical expertise, not political considerations. In their view, 
influence by individuals is to be avoided, not encouraged.73 Others 
take a quite different view, arguing that agencies should respond to 
concerns from the public, and should not try to reach their own 
 
 72. See Jon Elster, The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Political Theory, in 
FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL CHOICE THEORY 103, 121 (Jon Elster & Aanund Hylland eds., 1986) 
(describing the benefits of participation as the mere by-product, not the main goal, of political 
activity). 
 73. Perhaps the most famous exponent of this view was James Landis, who was the 
architect of the new administrative agencies created under Franklin D. Roosevelt. See RITCHIE, 
supra note 39, at 1–5 (introducing Landis’s philosophies); see also Gail L. Achterman & Sally K. 
Fairfax, Public Participation Requirements of the Federal Land Policy Management Act, 21 
ARIZ. L. REV. 501, 508 (1979) (“Public involvement programs . . . may easily mobilize dissent 
and heighten polarization, public frustration, and dissatisfaction.”); Jim Rossi, Participation Run 
Amok: The Costs of Mass Participation for Deliberative Agency Decisionmaking, 92 NW. U. L. 
REV. 173, 178 (1997) (“A threshold amount of participation is necessary to deliberative 
decisions, but at some point participation creates significant institutional costs for deliberative 
administrative process.”). 
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expert judgments in a vacuum.74 Thus the possibility that agency 
heads will receive valuable guidance from public-spirited citizens is 
matched against the possibility that those agency heads will receive 
biased or ill-conceived guidance from players who are motivated by a 
self-interest that is not in the public interest (e.g., special interest 
groups) or who are woefully ill-informed (e.g., citizens who are 
responding to scare tactics). Adding hundreds of thousands of new 
citizen participants to the rulemaking process would be particularly 
troubling to those who believe that citizens’ input would be 
misguided: they would fear that agencies would indeed respond to 
these new participants. Such participation may correlate to political 
mobilization, so an agency might bend to the participants’ wishes 
even if it did not believe that they represented the median American, 
as long as the agency believed that they represented a politically 
potent force. 
This description of the dichotomy is of course vastly 
oversimplified. There are many permutations in the setup of this 
debate—public choice theorists would suggest that everyone acts, to 
at least some degree, in her private interest, so that there is no truly 
“public-spirited” input, civic republican theorists would have a more 
sanguine view of the input of individuals, etc. Accordingly, the debate 
has taken many different forms over the years.75 Does it play out 
differently in the e-rulemaking context? Perhaps. 
As I noted in Part I, some of the proposals for e-rulemaking 
would allow for collaboration and/or for individuals rating others’ 
contributions. Working models of such enterprises include, most 
notably, Wikipedia and Slashdot. 
The idea behind Wikipedia is fairly straightforward: two heads 
are better than one, and one million heads are far better than one. 
The editors of Wikipedia do not claim that each addition will be an 
improvement, but they do claim that the movement will be toward a 
better product. New people will help to refine what is written, so 
continued adding/editing will improve it. 
 
 74. See, e.g., Ernest Gellhorn, Public Participation in Administrative Proceedings, 81 YALE 
L.J. 359, 380–81, 403 (1972) (arguing for the virtues of public participation in agency 
decisionmaking); Earl Bonfield, Public Participation in Federal Rulemaking Relating to Public 
Property, Loans, Grants, Benefits, or Contracts, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 540, 540 (1970) (contending 
that the interested public should participate in the rulemaking process). 
 75. For a good summary, see generally Nancy Roberts, Public Deliberation in an Age of 
Direct Citizen Participation, 34 AM. REV. PUB. ADMIN. 315, 315 (2004) (chronicling the history 
of and debate over direct citizen participation). 
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There is some dispute about the reliability of Wikipedia entries 
in comparison to conventional encyclopedias. Wiki skeptics suggest 
that adding people will lead not to continual improvement, but 
instead to regression to the mean. Robert McHenry, a former editor 
in chief of the Encyclopedia Britannica (and thus not a neutral 
observer) wrote a criticism of Wikipedia making exactly this 
argument. He focused on an entry on a subject about which he knew 
quite a bit (Alexander Hamilton) and found not only that it was 
riddled with errors and bad prose but also that the entry became 
worse as more people contributed to it.76 In his words, “the earlier 
versions of the article are better written overall, with fewer murky 
passages and sophomoric summaries. Contrary to the faith, the article 
has, in fact, been edited into mediocrity.”77 The journal Nature, 
however, undertook a more systematic study entailing peer review of 
forty-two scientific entries in Wikipedia and the Encyclopedia 
Britannica.78 It found that Wikipedia’s entries had more errors, but 
“the difference in accuracy was not particularly great: the average 
science entry in Wikipedia contained around four inaccuracies; 
Britannica, about three.”79 
There are, however, two reasons why the relatively positive 
experience underlying the Nature study would not extend to 
collaborative commenting on agency rulemaking. First, Wikipedia has 
a fairly sophisticated set of rules to deal with people whose 
contributions do more harm than good. Wikipedia’s founders 
recognized the danger posed by “cranks,” “trolls and flamers,” 
“partisans,” et cetera,80 and they created several mechanisms for 
 
 76. What actually happened in the case of the Alexander Hamilton entry is that, after the 
McHenry article appeared, a Wiki community member posted that entry on a webpage devoted 
to entries that needed to be improved/updated, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Peer_ 
review, and soon most of the errors and clumsiness that McHenry identified were removed. 
 77. Robert McHenry, The Faith-Based Encyclopedia, TCSDAILY, Nov. 15, 2004, 
http://www.techcentralstation.com/111504A.html; see also Can you trust Wikipedia?, THE 
GUARDIAN (U.K.), Oct. 24, 2005, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/ 
0,,1599116,00.html (compiling critiques of various Wikipedia entries). 
 78. Jim Giles, Internet Encyclopaedias Go Head to Head, NATURE (Dec. 14, 2005), 
available at http://www.nature.com/news/2005/051212/full/438900a.html (reporting on the Nature 
investigation that compares Wikipedia and Britannica). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Indeed, one of Wikipedia’s founders left the project and identified “the dominance of 
difficult people, trolls, and their enablers” as a major problem for Wikipedia. Larry Sanger, Why 
Wikipedia Must Jettison Its Anti-Elitism, Dec. 31, 2004, available at http://www.kuro5hin.org/ 
story/2004/12/30/142458/25; see also Stacy Schiff, Know it All: Can Wikipedia Conquer 
Expertise?, NEW YORKER, July 31, 2006, at 36 (“Even Eric Raymond, the open-source pioneer 
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policing the site to eliminate “patent nonsense.”81 Most notably, other 
users can edit such nonsense or, if they deem the entire entry to be 
nonsense, can list it on a page devoted to nominations for deleting 
entries.82 If the user is more confident of an entry’s worthlessness, she 
can make it a “candidate for speedy deletion.”83 Beyond that, there 
are a few hundred “administrators” of Wikipedia, each of whom has 
the authority to delete any page.84 There is even a dispute resolution 
process.85 And in 2005 (in response to a notorious episode in which an 
anonymously created Wikipedia entry falsely suggested that John 
Seigenthaler Sr. may have been involved in the Kennedy 
assassinations), the founder of Wikipedia announced that Wikipedia 
would stop accepting new pages from anonymous creators.86 
Creating a mechanism for crafting communications to agencies 
on the Wikipedia model would thus entail a substantial investment of 
time and energy for whichever private entity chose to do it—and it 
would have to be a private entity, as it is hard to imagine a 
government entity playing the editing role described above.87 It is 
 
whose work inspired [Wikipedia head] Wales, argues that ‘“disaster” is not too strong a word’ 
for Wikipedia. In his view, the site is ‘infested with moonbats.’”). 
 81. Wikipedia: Patent Nonsense, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Patent_nonsense 
(last visited May 4, 2006); see also Wikipedia: Replies to Common Objections, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Replies_to_common_objections (last visited May 4, 
2006) (noting ways to combat unhelpful contributions). 
 82. Wikipedia: Articles for Deletion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Votes_for_ 
deletion (last visited May 4, 2006). 
 83. Wikipedia: Criteria for Speedy Deletion, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia: 
Candidates_for_speedy_deletion (last visited May 4, 2006). 
 84. Wikipedia: List of Administrators, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:List_of_ 
administrators (last visited May 4, 2006). 
 85. Wikipedia: Resolving Disputes, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Dispute_ 
resolution (last visited May 4, 2006). For a fuller discussion of the Wikipedia dispute resolution 
process, see Joseph M. Reagle, Jr., A Case of Mutual Aid: Wikipedia, Politeness, and Perspective 
Taking, http://reagle.org/joseph/2004/agree/wikip-agree.html. 
 86. See Jimmy Wales, Experiment on new pages [E-mail to Wiki English listserv], available 
at http://mail.wikipedia.org/pipermail/wikien-l/2005-December/033880.html (“Today, as an 
experiment, we will be turning off new pages creation for anonymous users in the English 
Wikipedia.”); Article Creation Restricted to Logged-In Editors, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ 
Wikipedia:Wikipedia_Signpost/2005-12-05/Page_creation_restrictions (discussing this policy); 
see also Katharine Q. Seelye, Rewriting History; Snared in the Web of a Wikipedia Liar, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2005, § 4, at 1 (“Mr. Seigenthaler recently read about himself on Wikipedia and 
was shocked to learn that he ‘was thought to have been directly involved in the Kennedy 
assassinations of both John and his brother Bobby.’”). 
 87. The political costs associated with a government agency publicly identifying some 
submissions as worthless are so great, and the benefit to the agency of the agency being in 
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certainly possible that some person or group of people would go to 
the trouble to set up a wiki for communications to an agency, but it is 
not at all clear that individuals would come in significant numbers to 
such a wiki, as their contributions would be included in the 
communication to the agency only if the wiki’s controllers so agreed. 
Isn’t the same thing true for Wikipedia? Yes, but this highlights 
the second difference between Wikipedia and communications to an 
agency: such comments will heavily involve policy preferences, and 
thus the chances for disagreement are very high. One aspect of the 
Wikipedia model is that its entries are compilations of facts. And 
insofar as there are disputes about facts (e.g., whether surface 
temperatures on earth have risen over the last one hundred years), 
then the Wikipedia entry can compile the points made by either side. 
Communications to agencies involve facts, too, but policy 
considerations are almost always central. If, say, the EPA were to 
reconsider whether it should create a cap-and-trade system for 
emissions of carbon dioxide, various facts (including the rise in 
surface temperatures over the last one hundred years) would be 
relevant, but so, too, would fundamental policy choices.88 If two 
participants have opposite views on the propriety of the government’s 
regulating emissions of any pollutant, it is hard to see how a wiki 
would mediate their dispute. One will be heard and the other 
excluded (by an editor accepting one and not the other, or, if there is 
no editor, by whoever modifies the page last putting in her views); or 
both will be heard, in which case the resulting communication will be 
schizophrenic. 
This has, indeed, occurred on Wikipedia itself with respect to 
certain entries that reflected larger political positions. One notorious 
example occurred in the run-up to the November 2004 presidential 
election. People started vandalizing the pages of George Bush and 
John Kerry, and as soon as one person fixed a page it was vandalized 
again. In light of the problems, an administrator took the 
 
charge (as opposed to a private entity) sufficiently small, that the chances of a government 
agency taking on this responsibility seem slim. 
 88. See, e.g., Cary Coglianese & Gary E. Marchant, Shifting Sands: The Limits of Science in 
Setting Risk Standards, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1255, 1282 (2004) (“In setting [air quality standards], 
or any other regulatory standard, EPA officials need to draw upon the available scientific 
evidence on the health effects of different pollutants, but ultimately they must make a decision 
based on factors other than just the science. Standing alone, scientific data on ozone and 
particulate matter do not, and cannot, provide a principled justification for the level at which 
the respective air quality standards are set.”). 
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extraordinary (for Wikipedia) step of “freezing” the Bush and Kerry 
pages, despite the strongly worded Wikipedia norm against such 
freezing.89 But then another administrator, enforcing the norm against 
freezing, unfroze the pages, only to have them vandalized again. The 
pages were then frozen and unfrozen, back and forth, several more 
times.90 
I have been discussing a model that contains editors. What about 
collaboration with no editors or controllers? The answer would likely 
not be satisfactory. There is every reason to expect a continual back-
and-forth of deletions and reinsertions between those with competing 
views—like the battle over the Bush and Kerry pages, without the 
periods of freezing. Indeed, it seems reasonable to expect that some 
partisan (and there need be only one) would program her computer 
(as for Ebay auctions) to wait until the last moment before the 
communication was finalized, and then to replace the entire 
communication with one to her liking in the millisecond before such 
finalization. And, the inserted material might not even be responsive. 
That is what happened to the Los Angeles Times website when it 
experimented with a collaborative editorial: users repeatedly added 
pornography to the editorial, such that the editors finally decided to 
end the experiment prematurely.91 
Would it make sense to go further, with a regulation itself (as 
opposed to comments about a regulation) created by peer production, 
or a regulation as a wiki? No. The beauty of processes such as open 
source, peer production, and wikis is that they are ultimately 
producing a product that individuals can take or leave as they see fit. 
In contrast to the commercial context of peer production, a rule is not 
merely one of many products among which users can choose; it is 
imposed on all regulated parties. In the commercial context, a 
misbegotten project simply fails to gain adherents and is quickly 
 
 89. See Wikipedia: Replies to Common Objections, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia: 
Replies_to_common_objections (last visited May 4, 2006) (“As a community, almost all of us 
are opposed to what has been called the policy of completely ‘freezing’ particular pages . . . .”). 
 90. See Sarah Boxer, Mudslinging Weasels into Online History, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 10, 2004, 
at E1 (describing the Bush–Kerry incidents on Wikipedia, and noting that, at the times when the 
Bush and Kerry pages were frozen, “Senator Kerry and President Bush took their places next to 
the other untouchables in the Wikipedia: Ariel Sharon, Osama bin Laden, Rush Limbaugh and 
Salvador Allende”). 
 91. See Los Angeles Times Suspends ‘Wikitorials’: Users Flood Paper’s Web Site with Foul 
Language, Pornography, MSNBC, June 21, 2005, available at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/8300420/ 
(reporting the failure and cessation of the paper’s experiment with allowing readers to re-write 
the editorial). 
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forgotten. In the regulatory context, a misbegotten project imposes 
huge costs, precisely because it actually governs. Second, and 
relatedly, in the peer production context the goal is “rough 
consensus”—substantial agreement among the relevant players, but 
not universal agreement. And usually no single person or small group 
of people must be in the majority; if the overwhelming majority 
agrees on something but there are a few holdouts, the norm is that the 
agreement prevails, regardless of who the holdouts are. But that 
system presumes an absence of hierarchy, and in agencies there is a 
clear hierarchy: outsiders can come to whatever agreement they want, 
but the ultimate judgment is up to the agency head. The peer 
production model embodies a structure of rough consensus that 
presumes a particular arrangement—in which the agency head would 
go along with whatever “rough consensus” emerged—that would 
represent a significant shift in agency operations. Such a shift is 
possible, of course, but the argument for it needs to be made. Note 
that this was one of the objections to negotiated rulemaking; having 
people sitting around a table negotiating reduced the agency head to 
just another interested party.92 
If Wikipedia is not an attractive model for citizens’ 
communications to agencies, one obvious change would be to keep 
every person’s contribution intact, rather than let someone else edit 
or delete it. There could still be an element of collaboration if, say, 
people could rate, and respond to, others’ contributions. The model 
here is Slashdot and its Slash software. As I noted in Part I, anyone 
can submit a story, but editors filter out those they deem unhelpful. 
That filtering aspect is similar to the Wikipedia model and has its 
attendant advantages and disadvantages: it allows for greater focus, 
but at a cost of deleting some people’s views. Putting a small group of 
editors in charge of filtering everyone’s input would put a huge 
amount of pressure on the political ideology of those editors, with the 
attendant likelihood that they would filter out messages with which 
they disagreed. In addition, eliminating some voices is at cross-
purposes with the ideal of allowing open communication to agencies. 
 
 92. See, e.g., Funk, supra note 48, at 92 (“The concept of regulatory negotiation . . . 
[reduces] the agency to the level of a mere participant in the formulation of the rule, and . . . 
essentially [denies] that the agency has any responsibility beyond giving effect to the consensus 
achieved by the group.”); Patricia Wald, Negotiation of Environmental Disputes: A New Role for 
the Courts?, 10 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22 (1985) (warning that negotiated rulemakings could 
produce agreements that amount to “pure political logrolling” among the negotiating parties). 
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The stakes, and propriety, of deleting comments are different for a 
website devoted to providing relevant news than for one devoted to 
presenting the views of concerned citizens. 
But recall that on Slashdot, once stories make it through the 
opening filter, users submit comments, rate other people’s comments, 
and (when acting as “moderators,” or meta-raters) rate other people’s 
ratings. Might such a reputation-based system, without the additional 
element of exclusion of inputs that editors’ found unhelpful, be a 
good model for communications to agencies? It is possible. The 
Slashdot model seems more attractive than the wiki model. It would 
allow for everyone to add input, but each added comment would have 
a rating that an agency could use (as users of Slashdot regularly do) as 
a signal of value. So the agency could see, at a glance, which 
comments were deemed by other users to be of high quality, and 
which were not. This would avoid the disadvantages of deleting 
comments while still allowing for quality judgments by other users. If 
these quality judgments could be trusted, they could help agencies 
and courts determine which comments contained valuable input. 
But could they be trusted? There would still be the danger of 
quality judgments being centrally based on policy preferences. Asking 
people to make quality judgments about a news item is quite different 
from asking them to make such judgments about the desirability of 
environmental regulation. Indeed, as with Wikipedia, Slashdot may 
work because the stakes are relatively low: all that is at issue is the 
rating of an article. When it comes to commenting on important 
public disputes, users may find that their political preferences trump 
other considerations. 
There may be ways to mitigate the problems created by strongly 
held political views trumping other aspects of judgment. First, it may 
be that people recognize strong points and identify them as such even 
when they disagree. Second, and perhaps more realistically, a large 
number of negative ratings need not overwhelm the information 
conveyed by a large number of strongly positive ratings. Among the 
many points and arguments that might be put forward in favor of a 
given regulatory position, advocates of that position would have an 
interest in supporting the ones they deemed strongest. So if, among 
fifty different communications in favor of a particular policy position, 
one had a large number of very high ratings and a large number of 
very low ratings, whereas all the other communications had few high 
ratings (and whatever number of low ratings), the agency might 
conclude that the one with the most high ratings was deemed to be 
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the best point by the advocates of that view. Whether this metric 
would work would depend on the degree to which opponents of that 
position would intentionally confuse the system by giving a high 
rating to an argument that they deemed weak (a risky strategy, given 
that the agency might treat that high rating as support for the policy 
position more generally), and the degree to which such bad-faith 
commenters could be identified (e.g., if the agency could see that they 
were simultaneously giving high ratings to diametrically opposed 
policy positions). 
For better or worse, such poll skewing—in which people 
intentionally support voting positions (usually, candidates) whom 
they dislike in order to produce a weak opponent—is frequently 
alleged (it is of course hard to prove). Indeed, this was a stated fear of 
political parties that opposed open voting regimes under which those 
not registered in the party could vote in the party’s primaries; they 
feared that people hostile to the party’s agenda would vote for a weak 
candidate to hurt the party and help their own candidate of another 
party.93 One problem for those attempting poll skewing in the voting 
booth is that they fail to use their one vote to support their own 
candidate. In the virtual context, by contrast, an individual could try 
to have it both ways, by supporting both the arguments she liked and 
the ones of her opponents that she deemed weakest. Agencies could 
try to prevent such behavior by checking a given person’s ratings for 
consistency, but that entails significant costs and can be circumscribed 
by the person’s adopting more than one online identity. Agencies 
could try to avoid this last problem by allowing each person to have 
only one online identity, but that entails very great costs. It would be 
a massive undertaking to ensure that each online identity corresponds 
(a) to a real person who (b) actually signed up herself—as opposed to 
having her relative or friend sign up in her name, knowing that she 
would never bother to do so. 
In short, the familiar debates about the desirability of outside 
forces affecting agency decisions may have a somewhat different cast 
in the e-rulemaking context. The difficulty is that one cannot know 
whether it will in fact do so. More to the point, one cannot determine, 
a priori, whether the impact will be desirable. 
 
 93. See Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577–82 (2000) (holding 
unconstitutional a statute restricting political parties’ protected freedom to select nominees). 
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C. What Do the Results So Far Reveal? 
Commentators are not entirely in the world of speculation—
there are some data on the implementation of e-rulemaking thus far. 
What do they tell us? Professor Coglianese’s contribution to this 
symposium covers much of what I address in this Section,94 so my 
discussion will be relatively brief. 
In the pre–e-rulemaking era, pending rulemakings attracted 
relatively few comments from individuals; the main participants were 
major stakeholders.95 Has the advent of the Web and e-mail 
commenting brought about changes? Discouragingly, the answer is 
no. As to quantity, the empirical data suggest that the advent of the 
Web and e-mail commenting has not produced an increase in the 
number of comments.96 More robust data suggest that the 
introduction of e-mail comments has not increased comments for the 
overwhelming majority of rulemakings. That is, if the Internet has 
had any effect on the quantity of public communications with 
agencies, that effect is confined to a very small number of unusually 
salient rulemakings—ones for which interested groups mount huge 
public relations efforts (combined with form e-mails for people to 
send). If there is any increase in comments, in other words, it would 
appear to be attributable to the ease of sending form comments in 
response to publicity campaigns.97 
This is not entirely surprising. In other contexts, reducing costs 
has not led to an explosion of citizen participation. For instance, 
barriers to voting have been reduced in the last half century, and yet 
the percentage of the voting-age population that actually votes has 
declined during that time. And even experts in the rulemaking 
 
 94. See generally Cary Coglianese, Citizen Participation in Rulemaking: Past, Present, and 
Future, 55 DUKE L.J. 943 (2006). 
 95. See CORNELIUS M. KERWIN, RULEMAKING: HOW GOVERNMENT AGENCIES WRITE 
LAW AND MAKE POLICY 191–210 (1994); Coglianese, supra note 94, at 949–52. 
 96. See Steven J. Balla & Benjamin Daniels, Information Technology and Public 
Commenting on Agency Regulations (2005)(Midwest Political Science Association); see also 
Coglianese, supra note 94, at 954–55. 
 97. See John M. de Figueiredo, E-Rulemaking: Bringing Data to Theory at the Federal 
Communications Commission, 55 DUKE L.J. 969, 988 (2006) (noting that a “spike in comments 
should not necessarily be interpreted as demonstrating heightened interest from individuals”). 
But see Coglianese, Internet and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 52 (discussing a relative 
dearth of comments submitted through Regulations.gov in spite of its publicity). 
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process (for whom the costs of participation are presumably lower) 
often do not file comments.98 
If the Internet has had little or no impact on the quantity of 
public participation, what about the quality of such participation? 
Again, the results are discouraging. The studies thus far find that the 
individual comments do not put forward new data or arguments. 
Individuals have overwhelmingly sent form letters, or form letters 
with an additional sentence or two that adds no new rationales, data, 
or arguments that the agency would not have already received.99 Are 
the participants who submit electronic comments engaging in greater 
deliberative activity? Again, the answer so far is no. An empirical 
study found that “electronic commenters do not appear to be any 
more deliberatively engaged than paper commenters.”100 The 
evidence so far indicates that the additional individual involvement 
enabled by e-rulemaking has neither produced different regulatory 
outcomes nor produced the degree of engagement among the 
citizenry that some have expected.101 
 
 98. Professor Peter Strauss surveyed the members of the American Bar Association’s 
Section on Administrative Law and Regulatory Practice in 2003. Strauss, supra note 32, at 8, 
available at http://www.ksg.harvard.edu/cbg/rpp/erulemaking/papers_reports/Strauss_ 
Erulemaking_Survey.pdf. He discovered that many of the 320 respondents said that they looked 
at websites for research purposes (often agency websites), but that only 45 percent had filed 
comments in any rulemaking proceedings in the previous three years. Id. As Professor 
Coglianese noted, “[i]f the majority of the most relevant legal specialists do not file comments in 
rulemakings, we probably should not expect to see a large proportion of ordinary citizens filing 
comments, even with a more digitized and accessible rulemaking process.” Coglianese, Internet 
and Citizen Participation, supra note 1, at 54. 
 99. See de Figueiredo, supra note 97, at 990 (deflating the relative significance of volume 
spikes in public e-comments between 1998 and 2004); Stuart W. Shulman, Whither Deliberation? 
Mass e-Mail Campaigns and U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking 5 (Jan. 2, 2006), available at 
http://erulemaking.ucsur.pitt.edu/doc/papers/Whither Deliberation.pdf (“To date, there is very 
little evidence that the actual public comment text submitted meets any of our deliberative 
thresholds.”). 
 100. David Schlosberg et al., ‘To Submit a Form or Not to Submit a Form, That Is the 
(Real) Question’: Deliberation and Mass Participation in U.S. Regulatory Rulemaking 15 (May 
5, 2005) (unpublished paper, on file with the Duke Law Journal). 
 101. Shulman, supra note 99, at 14–15. Shulman examined a sample of e-mails sent to 
agencies as part of a campaign by environmental groups to get citizens involved in the 
rulemaking process via the Internet. He concluded that: 
At this early stage in the research (and in the epoch of mass e-mail campaigns) there 
are few indications that online deliberation is enhanced within the current 
eGovernment configuration in the United States. The mass e-mail campaign in 
particular appears to be an odd and possibly counter-productive tribute to twentieth 
century notions of one-directional, non-deliberative, un-reflexive nose counting. 
Although the medium could be used to promote better dialogue, debate and 
deliberation, and public understanding, it falls short of the loftier ideals held out by 
hopeful political theorists. 
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Indeed, perhaps the most obvious result of the implementation 
of e-rulemaking is the rise of campaigns using form e-mails aimed at 
agencies, and the concomitant rise in consulting groups that help to 
organize those campaigns.102 Interest groups have done a good job of 
presenting alarming (often misleading) statistics on their websites as a 
means of pushing people to submit e-mail comments to agencies.103 
This has often proved to be an effective organizing tool, but it does 
not appear to convey useful information to the agency.104 
D. The Case for Modest, Skeptical Experimentation 
The analysis could stop here. That is, policymakers could decide 
that they have enough information to determine that e-rulemaking 
simply will not have a positive impact that will justify the costs of its 
implementation (and maybe not have any positive impact at all). That 
would be a reasonable conclusion, given the disappointing results so 
 
Id. at 14–15; see also Dietram A. Scheufele & Matthew C. Nisbet, Being a Citizen Online: New 
Opportunities and Dead Ends, PRESS/POLITICS, July 1, 2002, at 55, 69 (presenting empirical 
findings and concluding that “the role of the Internet in promoting active and informed 
citizenship is minimal”); Darrell M. West, E-Government and the Transformation of Service 
Delivery and Citizen Attitudes, 64 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 15, 15–16 (2004) (finding that e-
government has failed to transform service delivery or public trust in government); Sylvia Tesh, 
The Internet and the Grass Roots, 15 ORG. & ENV’T 336, 336 (2002) (arguing that the Internet is 
merely another tool in the narrow range of citizen options in policy-making participation, and 
that it moreover robs grassroots movements of the motivational power of physical public 
hearings). 
 102. E.g., Capitol Advantage Home Page, http://www.capitoladvantage.com (last visited 
July 10, 2006); GetActive Home Page, http://www.getactive.com (last visited July 10, 2006); 
Kintera Advocacy Product Page, http://www.ctsg.com (last visited July 10, 2006). 
According to two consultants to agencies, this is part of a larger problem: 
The Internet as a means for expanded public participation in rulemaking has inspired 
a sort of rulemaking arms race. Some commenter organizations are investing 
excessive time and money in technology that will enable them and their members to 
produce large numbers of comments as quickly as possible in response to any 
rulemaking. Some commenter organizations are convinced that their position is 
strengthened by taking ten salient points and masquerading them as thousands of 
unique thoughts from thousands of thoughtful taxpayers. 
  Under the current e-rulemaking plan, interest groups spend money on the latest 
software to generate thousands of e-comments, and agencies are forced to invest in 
sophisticated software that will enable them to mine the thousands of comments to 
identify the ten salient points. This is a silly, wasteful, and circular game the 
rulemaking world has engaged in. 
Emery & Emery, supra note 26, at 8. 
 103. E.g., http://www.cleartheair.org/mercury (presenting concerns about mercury and then 
providing a link along with the statements “Take Action by telling the EPA to strengthen the 
mercury rule. Click to send a comment to the EPA docket.”); see supra note 30. 
 104. For a discussion of the insignificance of e-mail quantity as an indicator, see supra notes 
29–43 and accompanying text. 
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far, but on balance it would be a mistake. Further experimentation 
with e-rulemaking both might uncover forms of e-rulemaking that are 
worth the costs and might give policymakers valuable information 
about the rulemaking process. I believe that neither of these potential 
benefits on its own would justify further development of e-
rulemaking initiatives, but that the combination of the two justifies a 
modest level of experimentation with new e-rulemaking initiatives. 
The possibility that some forms of e-rulemaking will have 
benefits that outweigh the costs is fairly straightforward in light of the 
previous discussion. Although the data on e-rulemaking are 
discouraging, they are also incomplete. Our experience with the 
current experiments is fairly brief, and broader changes (such as wikis 
and reputation-based systems) have not been attempted. Insofar as 
comments from individuals have added little to what agencies already 
received from existing commenters, it could be that individuals simply 
will not add much; but it also could be (as some e-rulemaking 
proponents contend) that merely allowing citizens to e-mail agencies 
changes fairly little, whereas creating opportunities for meaningful 
collaboration with or rating by individuals will present points and 
data that agencies would not otherwise receive. Similarly, the fact that 
input thus far seems not to have changed agencies’ rulemakings could 
mean that agencies will not be affected by input from individuals; but 
it could be that they will be affected if more valuable input comes 
from individuals via collaboration or rating. Put differently, 
researchers have not run the experiments that would allow them to 
determine whether the patterns in the offline world (where individual 
comments have little impact) would apply if the broader e-
rulemaking proposals were fully implemented for at least some 
rulemakings. The existing data are too limited to give much guidance 
on these issues. 
The second potential benefit is less obvious: e-rulemaking 
initiatives may give policymakers valuable information about the 
rulemaking process. E-rulemaking is not specifically aimed at 
increasing transparency and creating more data for researchers. The 
stated motivation behind e-rulemaking is to confer the benefits 
discussed in this Article. But the effect of e-rulemaking may be to 
enhance researchers’ and policymakers’ understanding of the 
rulemaking process. Such a greater understanding does not depend 
on e-rulemaking producing the benefits that its proponents have put 
forward. It may be that full implementation of e-rulemaking 
initiatives does not produce more citizen involvement, better input 
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from citizens, or changes in agency behavior, but that it nonetheless 
sheds light on how agencies operate by giving researchers additional 
tools to track how materials are presented to agencies and how those 
agencies choose to respond (or not to respond) to them. If, for 
example, e-rulemaking increases the quantity and quality of citizen 
participation in the commenting process, but these increases have no 
impact on agencies’ behavior, that fact will suggest that agencies’ 
decisions are not affected by those comments and instead are 
influenced by other inputs. This result would be disappointing to e-
rulemaking proponents, but it might be useful for those trying to 
understand how agencies work—and in particular the degree to which 
they are captured by powerful entities. It is not clear that such 
information would make experimenting with additional e-rulemaking 
initiatives worth the cost, but adding the value of the information 
created by the agencies’ non-responsiveness makes it a closer 
question. By contrast, if new e-rulemaking initiatives did not increase 
the quantity or quality of citizen participation, then the goals of the e-
rulemaking proponents would not be advanced and researchers 
would learn nothing new about agencies. All they would learn is that 
people believe they have better things to do with their time than 
comment to agencies, even when such commenting is interactive—
information that would not seem to be worth the cost of creating new 
e-rulemaking initiatives. The outcome that would most likely produce 
benefits greater than the costs would arise if it appeared that the 
additional participation resulting from new e-rulemaking initiatives 
did have a positive impact on the agency. In those circumstances, e-
rulemaking would thus not only change agency behavior for the 
better but also provide valuable evidence about agency 
decisionmaking. 
Experimentation will not provide definitive answers. Any given 
agency action will always have its own idiosyncrasies, and the metrics 
for determining the quality of public participation and the impact of 
that participation on agencies will always be imperfect. After all, 
researchers can create clear, objective metrics (e.g., number of 
comments submitted to an agency by members of the public) that 
may not have any correlation to an agreed-upon definition of quality. 
Meanwhile, they can instead use qualitative measurements, but of 
course those are contestable. They could, for example, look to see 
whether public participation added valuable ideas, but that would 
require deciding which ideas really are valuable. But researchers 
could gain data that, in combination with possibly contestable 
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judgments and assumptions about causal mechanisms, should provide 
some useful information. If, for example, wider public participation 
produced a point or argument that did not appear elsewhere and was 
not obvious, and that point or argument ended up in the agency’s 
regulation, one might surmise that there was a reasonable chance that 
the public participation had influenced the agency’s decision. 
Policymakers could then draw conclusions about the value of that 
influence, depending of course on contestable judgments of value. 
There are lots of ways that agencies can tweak their procedures 
to increase transparency and provide additional data. They do not 
need to implement e-rulemaking to gain that information. So if the 
goal is more information about how agencies operate, why not pursue 
that goal directly and jettison the e-rulemaking proposals (unless they 
happened to be the best way to produce additional information about 
the rulemaking process)? The answer, as I suggested above, is that 
more ambitious e-rulemaking implementation may have the benefits 
that their proponents have put forward, and failing to determine 
whether those benefits materialize would be a missed opportunity. By 
adding a new element of procedures designed to encourage public 
participation, policymakers can not only gain information about the 
rulemaking process but also more directly evaluate those new 
procedures. 
I do not believe that this justifies across-the-board adoption of e-
rulemaking proposals. The costs of such implementation are too high, 
and the benefits too uncertain. But I believe it does justify 
experimentation with such proposals by some agencies, so that 
agencies can serve as laboratories of democracy. The classic instance 
of laboratories of democracy is state experimentation,105 but agency 
experimentation seems at least as attractive. State experimentation 
has the advantage of allowing for comparison insofar as states are 
similarly situated, but it has the disadvantage of potentially significant 
costs for interstate activities: a single company might have to comply 
with a dozen different regulatory schemes as its activities cross state 
lines. Each agency regulates a different sector of the economy, so that 
comparison among agencies is not always easy (although comparison 
among states is also not as easy as one might imagine, given the 
variability among state regimes). But the advantage of 
 
 105. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) 
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may . . . 
serve as a laboratory . . . .”). 
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experimentation for agencies is that agencies regulate at the national 
level, so experimentation does not increase costs for regulated 
parties. 
As I noted in Part I, the federal government has moved away 
from individual agency experimentation and toward a uniform set of 
e-rulemaking protocols.106 Such centralization may have benefits, 
particularly insofar as it reduces the costs for individuals to 
participate in agency actions.107 But this discussion highlights that it 
has significant costs, because it minimizes the divergence among 
agencies and thus the possibilities for experimentation. If the choice is 
between across-the-board implementation of further e-rulemaking 
initiatives or not, this Article suggests the latter choice. But modest 
experimentation is the best choice. 
CONCLUSION 
I have tried in this Article to describe the possible outcomes, and 
evaluations, of the implementation of e-rulemaking. The key word is 
“possible.” My Article, filled with words like “could” and “might,” 
highlights the uncertainty surrounding the effects of e-rulemaking. 
This is not an accident. One of my main contentions is that e-
rulemaking could play out in a variety of different ways, and for this 
reason it is difficult to be confident in my judgments. 
We know something about the costs: implementation of e-
rulemaking proposals will entail nontrivial costs.108 If e-rulemaking 
inspires any significant number of citizens to participate, agencies will 
have to devote considerable resources to considering this new input. 
And if e-rulemaking does not inspire significant new input, then it will 
not be terribly costly, but it will also be of little benefit; by hypothesis, 
whatever effort agencies will expend in creating e-rulemaking 
procedures will inspire a collective yawn. So the costs of 
implementation exist, and they should make us wary. 
 
 106. See supra notes 11–12 and accompanying text. 
 107. It is not clear that centralization will reduce costs for users. For instance, it may be that 
most of those who would want to send communications to the Environmental Protection 
Agency or the Federal Communications Commission would find it more convenient to go 
directly to the agency’s website and/or would find a commenting system tailored to that agency 
more valuable or easy to use. The empirical data on this question are too sparse thus far for 
researchers to be able to draw conclusions on this question. The point in text, of course, is that 
there are other reasons to be wary of uniform implementation of e-rulemaking initiatives. 
 108. Or the e-rulemaking proposals will entail small costs but have trivial benefits. See supra 
Part II. 
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The empirical data so far are discouraging, but we do not know 
enough about the benefits of e-rulemaking to rule out the further 
implementation of e-rulemaking proposals. Most fundamentally, we 
do not know whether the input enabled by e-rulemaking will be 
beneficial, we do not know whether the agency will respond to it, or 
how courts will respond to the agency’s action, and thus we do not 
know whether, in light of the costs and the benefits, it makes sense to 
undertake ambitious e-rulemaking initiatives. If I ended the analysis 
here, I would end with a position of skepticism but uncertainty: my 
assessment is that e-rulemaking likely is not worth the costs, but that 
we cannot quantify the possibilities with confidence. 
The analysis need not stop there, however. Policymakers can 
encourage modest experimentation with new e-rulemaking 
procedures, as that will allow them to evaluate such procedures and 
gain additional information about the rulemaking process. Our 
skepticism about e-rulemaking—informed by the disappointing 
empirical data so far—counsels against a massive investment in e-
rulemaking initiatives. But our uncertainty over the possible benefits 
of e-rulemaking, combined with the possibility of new data on 
rulemaking, counsels in favor additional experimentation. 
It bears noting that our uncertainty about the benefits of e-
rulemaking stems in significant part from the fact that rulemaking has 
long been an insiders’ game. Public participation has never been 
terribly easy or encouraged. A member of the public could file a 
formal comment (which is time-consuming) or send a form letter or e-
mail (with little reason to believe that it would make a difference), 
but she had no easy mechanisms to collaborate with other citizens. 
Ignorance about the likely level and quality of public participation 
has thus been in part a function of the relative inaccessibility of the 
rulemaking process to members of the public. Meanwhile, ignorance 
about how agencies decide—and in particular whether they are 
influenced by communications that are not generated by interest 
groups—flows from a lack of good empirical data about the effect 
that such communications actually have on agencies. Both forms of 
ignorance could be alleviated by experimentation with e-rulemaking. 
Thus the promise of e-rulemaking, in my view, is that it may 
produce valuable changes in the rulemaking process, and it may give 
us more information about the rulemaking process. Skeptical 
experimentation, then, will yield two kinds of data—more 
information about the attractiveness of e-rulemaking and more 
information about how rulemakings take shape—without imposing 
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the larger costs that full implementation of e-rulemaking would 
entail. Even if e-rulemaking initiatives prove to have little impact, 
they may thus serve the salutary purpose of providing better 
information upon which to base future initiatives to change the 
regulatory process. 
